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Summary
Security protocols play an important role in our everyday life. In particular, they
are used when paying with bank cards or performing online payments. In this thesis
we look at the complex security protocols that are used in these systems: the EMV
protocol family, used in bank cards, and the TLS protocol, used to secure network
connections. Just the specifications of these protocols can already be hundreds of
pages long. We analyse these protocols from different angles. On the one hand we
perform a formal analysis of protocol specifications. For this analysis we specify the
protocol in F# and make use of the ProVerif tool for the verification. On the other
hand we also look at actual implementations of protocols. For this we make use
of automated learning techniques to infer state machines from implementations of
security protocols.
The first protocol we discuss is EMV, the world’s leading standard for payments
with smart cards: at the moment over 1.5 billion EMV cards are in use and worldwide
almost all bank cards with a chip on them are EMV compliant. The core specifications
are over 700 pages and every payment processor has additional proprietary specifica-
tions on top of this. Using ProVerif and FS2PV we analysed the EMV specifications,
modelled in F#. Though the model was quite large and resulted in an even larger
pi-calculus model, we were still able to perform an automated analysis. This revealed
known weaknesses for EMV. To analyse implementations of EMV, we performed an
analysis using automated learning techniques on EMV bank cards.
For online banking, many banks let their clients use a hand-held smart card reader
with a small display and keypad. In combination with a smart card and PIN code, this
reader then signs challenges provided on the bank’s website, to either log in or confirm
bank transfers. Many of these systems use a proprietary standard of MasterCard
called the Chip Authentication Program, also known as EMV-CAP. This standard
is based on the EMV standard. We analysed a device used for online banking that
makes use of this security protocol, the e.dentifier2. Both a manual and a automated
analyses were performed of this device that show that it contains a security issue.
Based on our observations we present a solution, called the Radboud Reader, to
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secure online transactions that provides stronger security guarantees than existing
solutions.
When using online banking websites, or visiting other websites for which security
is important, the TLS protocol is used. Using the same automated learning techniques
as we used in the previous analyses, we analyse eight different TLS implementations.
This resulted in the discovery of various security flaws and functional bugs in widely
used implementations.
Samenvatting
Security protocollen spelen een belangrijke rol in ons alledaagse leven. Met name bij
het betalen met bankpassen of het gebruik van online bankieren. In dit proefschrift
kijken we naar de complexe security protocollen die worden gebruikt in deze system:
de EMV protocol familie, gebruikt in bankpassen, en het TLS protocol, gebruikt
om netwerkverbindingen te beveiligen. Alleen de specificaties van deze protocollen
kan al honderden pagina’s lang zijn. We analyseren deze vanuit verschillende kan-
ten. Aan de ene kant voeren we een formele analyse uit van de protocol specificaties.
Voor deze analyse specificeren we het protocol in F# en maken we gebruik van de
ProVerif tool voor de verificatie. Aan de andere kant kijken we ook naar daadwerkeli-
jke implementaties van protocollen. Hiervoor maken we gebruik van geautomatiseerde
leertechnieken om toestandsdiagrammen van implementaties van security protocollen
af te leiden.
Het eerste protocol waar we naar kijken is EMV, de grootste standaard wereldwijd
voor betalingen met smart cards: momenteel zijn er meer dan 1,5 miljard EMV
kaarten in gebruik en bijna alle kaarten met een chip erin zijn EMV compliant. De
basis specificaties bevatten meer dan 700 pagina’s en elke payment processor heeft
bijkomende eigen specificaties die hier bovenop komen. Met behulp van ProVerif
en FS2PV hebben we een analyse gemaakt van de EMV specificaties, gemodelleerd
in F#. Hoewel dit model behoorlijk groot was en resulteerde in een nog groter pi-
calculus model, konden we nog steeds een automatische analyse uitvoeren. Hierbij
werden bekende zwakheden van EMV gevonden. Om implementaties van EMV te
analyseren hebben we een analyse met behulp van geautomatiseerde leertechnieken
gebruikt uitgevoerd van EMV bankpassen.
Om te internetbankieren laten veel banken hun klanten gebruik maken van een
paslezer met een klein scherm en toetsenbord. In combinatie met een smart card en
PIN code, kan deze lezer challenges op de webstie van de bank ondertekenen om in
te loggen of overschrijvingen te bevestigen. Veel van deze systemen maken gebruik
van een eigen standaard van MasterCard genaamd Chip Authentication Program,
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ook wel bekend als EMV-CAP. Deze standaard is gebaseerd op de EMV standaard.
We hebben een lezer geanalyseerd die gebruik maakt van dit security protocol: de
e.dentifier2. Zowel een handmatige als een automatische analyse van deze lezer wezen
uit dat het een zwakheid bevat. Gebaseerd op onze observaties presenteren we een
oplossing, genaamd de Radboud Reader, voor het beveiligen van online transacties
die sterker veiligheidsgaranties geeft dan bestaande oplossingen.
Wanneer websites voor internetbankieren, of andere websites waarvoor beveiliging
belangrijk is, worden bezocht wordt gebruik gemaakt van het TLS protocol. Met ge-
bruik van dezelfde geautomatiseerde leertechnieken zoals gebruikt in de voorgaande
analyses, analyseren we acht verschillende TLS implementaties. Dit resulteerde in
de ontdekking van verschillende veiligheidsproblemen en functionele fouten in veelge-
bruikte implementaties.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Security protocols are employed all the time in everyday life when using electronic
communication, often without users being aware of it. A security protocol is a combi-
nation of cryptographic computations and exchanges of messages in order to perform
some security-sensitive operation between two or more parties. They are invoked
when connecting to a website using HTTPS or paying for groceries at the supermar-
ket using your bank card. To make sure your bank card works in every shop and
you can visit every website, these protocols are standardised. In this thesis we ex-
plore methods for better and more systematic security analyses of security protocols
and their implementations. This is done by considering real-life complex case studies
from the financial sector and the Internet. Since there are many parties involved in
writing these standards they can get very long and ambiguous to allow for flexibility
within the standard. For example, for the EMV protocol, which is used throughout
this thesis, the core specification consists of 4 books covering over 700 pages. One of
the reasons specifications tend to become long is backwards compatibility. Still one
can question whether these specifications really have to be this long and complex.
Security protocols are notoriously hard to get right, even if they do not need over 700
pages of specifications:
“Security protocols are three-line programs that people still manage to get wrong”
– Roger Needham
As these specifications will be the basis of any implementation of the protocol, it
is important that they are correct and no security weaknesses exist in the protocol
itself. This can, for example, be ensured by using formal methods, where a protocol
is analysed using rigorous mathematical techniques. An example of this is resolution
of Horn clauses as used in the ProVerif tools [Bla01]. Formal methods are mainly
used on abstract small protocols. In this thesis it is shown that this technique not
only works for these small protocols but also for the ones used in complex real-life
systems. A comparable complex protocol that also has been verified is, for example,
UMTS [AMR+12].
However, having a correct protocol is only one side of the story. The protocol will
be implemented and, especially with large and complex standards, it is not trivial to do
this correctly. Where with a ‘regular’ protocol a mistake in an implementation might
result in a system that does not work properly, a mistake in a security protocol might
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lead to problems where confidential information is leaked or authentication could be
bypassed. It is therefore important to not only check whether protocol specifications
are secure, but also to analyse whether implementations of these protocols adhere to
the specifications and do not introduce any security problems.
As running case studies in this thesis we look at the EMV protocol family and
TLS. EMV is one of the most important group of payment protocols: it is used in
over 1.5 billion bank cards in the world and is used in almost all bank cards within
Europe [EMV08]. Not only are the core specifications huge, also every payment
system has additional proprietary specifications on top of this. Over the years various
problems with EMV have been discovered. These discoveries where made in manual
ad-hoc ways. We present an automated analysis of the EMV protocol specifications,
where we make use of formal methods. Next to analysing the specifications, we
also analyse actual implementations of EMV on real bank cards. To analyse these
implementations we used automated learning techniques to learn their working. This
automated learning results in models of the state machines of these cards, which can
easily be inspected manually or using a model-checker. This revealed a wide range of
implementation differences, but no security flaws.
When using online banking, many banks provide their customers with handheld
smart card readers with a small display and keypad. Many of these systems use a pro-
prietary standard of MasterCard called the Chip Authentication Program, also known
as EMV-CAP. This is a proprietary standard on top of the EMV standard. Examples
of these devices are the Random Reader from the Rabobank and the e.dentifier2 from
ABN AMRO. If a customer wants to perform a transaction, first the PIN code is
entered on this device, which is checked by the bank card. After this the customer
enters a challenge that is displayed on the bank’s website. This challenge is then used
by the device to compute a response to confirm the transaction. This response is com-
puted using cryptographic operations on the bank card. We analysed one of these
devices, the e.dentifier2, using both manual and automated analysis. This resulted
in the discovery of a security flaw in the device. The security guarantees provided by
this device are not optimal and constructing the protocols, used in the device, on top
of EMV-CAP might not be the best solution. In our automated analysis it became
clear that the implementation is more complex than necessary. Based on these ob-
servations we designed the Radboud Reader, a minimal handheld smart card reader
that can be used to authenticate online transaction.
To secure the connection between a web browser and server, the HTTPS protocol
is used. The security in this protocol is provided by the TLS protocol (also known
as SSL). This is used by – hopefully – all banks as a first step to secure their online
banking. Because it is such a widely used protocol, TLS attracted a lot of attention
from researchers. This led to many problems found in both the specification and im-
plementations. Many implementations of TLS exist and we developed an automated
analysis that we applied to the most widely used implementations. This analysis led
to the discovery of new security bugs.
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1.1 Overview
Chapter 2 In this chapter we introduce the necessary technical background on
smart cards and the tools used for our formal analysis and automated state machine
learning.
Chapter 3 In this chapter we introduce background on the EMV standard and
known attacks. This is a first comprehensive but concise overview of EMV. In this
chapter the following publication is discussed, which provides a mitigation for one of
the known attacks:
• A Lightweight Distance-Bounding Contactless EMV Payment Protocol by Tom
Chothia, Flavio Garcia, the author, Jordi van den Breekel and Matthew Thomp-
son [CGR+15]. For this paper my contribution was in providing the necessary
background in EMV on how the proposed solution fits within the EMV standard
and I was involved in setting up the relay attacks described.
Chapter 4 In this chapter we perform a formal analysis on EMV, both on the
abstract level of the specifications and on actual implementations on bank cards.
The formal verification of specifications is done using the existing tools ProVerif and
FS2PV. This is the first formal specification of all of EMV and one of the largest
formalisations of a security protocol suite. To analyse an actual implementation of
EMV, we use automated learning techniques to extract the internal state machines
from bank cards. This chapter is based on the following publications:
• Formal Analysis of the EMV Protocol Suite by the author and Erik Poll [RP12].
• The SmartLogic Tool: Analysing and Testing Smart Card Protocols by Gerhard
de Koning Gans and the author [KGR12]. My contribution is in the case study
on EMV that we performed together.
• Formal Models of Bank Cards for Free by Fides Aarts, the author and Erik Poll
[ARP13]. My contribution was in constructing the test harness to communicate
with EMV cards necessary for the automated learning and the analysis of the
resulting models.
Chapter 5 After analysis of the ‘core’ specifications of EMV in Chapter 4 we discuss
EMV-CAP in this chapter. This variant of EMV is used to perform online banking
transactions using an EMV card and a handheld reader. We look at a USB-connected
EMV-CAP reader by Gemalto, the e.dentifier2. To automatically analyse this device,
we extend our automated learning technique to be able to handle physical key presses
and sending of USB commands. This chapter is based on the following publications:
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• Designed to Fail: A USB-Connected Reader for Online Banking by Arjan Blom,
Gerhard de Koning Gans, Erik Poll, the author and Roel Verdult [BKGP+12].
My contribution was in the analysis of the handheld smart card reader.
• Automated Reverse Engineering using Lego by Georg Chalupar, Stefan Pe-
herstorfer, Erik Poll and the author [CPPR14]. My main contribution is in
the analysis of the results and fine-tuning of the automated learning process.
Georg and Stefan built the original robot, which is controlled using a Raspberry
Pi.
Chapter 6 The problems with the e.dentifier2 discussed in Chapter 5 suggested
that during the design the security objectives and attacker were not explicitly taken
into account. In this chapter we present our optimal solution for a USB-connected
card reader for securing online transactions: the Radboud Reader. This device has a
minimal trusted computing base and provides the strongest possible security guaran-
tees. This chapter is based on the following publication:
• The Radboud Reader: A Minimal Trusted Smartcard Reader for Securing Online
Transactions by Erik Poll and the author [PR13].
Chapter 7 In this chapter we apply the automated learning technique that was
applied previously on bank cards (Chapter 4) and the e.dentifier2 (Chapter 5) to
a different kind of security protocol, namely the Transport Layer Security (TLS)
protocol. This chapter is based on the following publication:
• Protocol state fuzzing of TLS implementations by the author and Erik Poll
[RP15].
Other papers published during the author’s PhD research, but not directly related
to this thesis, are [WRF12,CRP14,Rui14].
Chapter 2
Preliminaries
In this chapter we give some background on the methods and tools used in the rest
of this thesis. As smart cards play a big role in most of the protocols we will analyse,
these are discussed in Section 2.1. After this we discuss the automated analysis of
security protocols, which we will use in our analysis of the EMV specifications in Chap-
ter 4. This is followed by the introduction of automated learning techniques, which
we use in our analysis of implementations of EMV and EMV-CAP, the e.dentifier2
and TLS in chapters 4, 5 and 7 respectively.
2.1 Smart cards
Smart cards are widely used as, for example, bank cards, access cards, passports
and public transportation cards. A smart card, also known as Integrated Circuit
Card (ICC), is basically a small computer, with its own processor and memory, that
can perform computations. As they are mostly used for security purposes, they often
contain a cryptographic co-processor as well. Communication between a card and a
terminal, like a Point of Sale (POS) or ATM, can be done using either the contacts
on the card or contactless via radio waves.
2.1.1 ISO/IEC 7816
For terminals and smart cards to be able to communicate they have to speak the same
language. To achieve this the international standard ISO/IEC 7816 was introduced
[ISOb]. This standard specifies various aspects related to smart cards, ranging from
physical characteristics, like dimensions of cards and positions of contacts, to formats
of data that is exchanged, and from electrical specifications to a full card application
for cryptographic operations. The standard is widely used and most smart cards
confirm to it. The standard was originally intended for contact-based smart cards,
but the higher level aspects, like the data formats, are also used for contactless cards.
For the lower level details in the contactless communication ISO/IEC 14443 can be
used [ISOa]. This standard is for example used in passports and contactless bank
cards.
ISO/IEC 7816 allows multiple applications to be present on a smart card. To
distinguish the different application, each one is identified by an Application Identifier
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(AID). Using the so-called SELECT command, that is specified in the standard, the
terminal can indicate with which application it wants to interact. AIDs for certain
applications have been standardised, and a smart card can have one application that
is selected by default.
APDUs
For the communication between a card and terminal, the ISO/IEC 7816 standard
specifies so-called Application Protocol Data Units (APDUs). The communication
between a terminal and card is done using a master/slave protocol. This means the
terminal will always send a command to the card first, after which the card will send
a response. The terminal sends Command APDUs to the card, to which the card will
respond with a Response APDU. A Command APDU is structured as follows:
CLA INS P1 P2 (Lc) (Data) (Le)
The first two bytes, also known as class and instruction byte respectively, indicate the
command that the terminal requests the card to perform. The bytes P1 and P2 can
be used to specify additional parameters. The Lc byte is used to indicate the length
of the data that will follow, if this data is present. Le is used to indicate the length
of data the terminal expects in return to the command. The card’s Response APDU
is formatted as follows:
(Data) SW1 SW2
The card can optionally return data to the terminal, but the response will always
end with two bytes called the Status Word. This Status Word indicates whether
the operation was completed successfully (typically by returning 9000) or whether an
error occurred. It can also be used to indicate the card has more data available for
the terminal.
2.1.2 Attacking smart cards
When attacking smart cards, we distinguish between active and passive attacks. These
attacks can be either targeted on the communication between terminal and card, or on
physical properties of the card, such as power usage or electromagnetic radiation. This
second kind of attack is known as side-channel attacks. With passive attacks we only
observe the communication between genuine cards and terminals without interfering.
This information can then be used, for example, to reverse engineer the protocol that
is used or harvest interesting data, such as personal data or PIN codes. An example
is a device that can be used for this is the APDU Scanner by Rebel Simcard1 or the
Season Passive 2 Interface by Interesting Devices Ltd2. Though these devices are
1http://rebelsimcard.com
2http://interesting-devices.com
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respectively targeted at users that analyse SIM cards to unlock phones or want to
share cards used in set-top boxes for digital television, they can be used for other
smart cards and readers as well.
With active attacks the communication between the card and the terminal is
modified by a Man-in-the-Middle (MitM). This can already be done using very small
pieces of hardware called shims. These devices are placed in between the contacts of
the card and the terminal and contain a microprocessor to process all communication.
As all the communication goes through the shim it is able to modify, drop or add
data. This technique is, for example, used in phones, such that they can work with
different mobile network operators apart from the one that sold the phone. A more
generic tool called the SmartLogic is presented in [KGR12]. This tool can be used
to perform MitM attacks or even completely emulate cards. Usually published active
attacks are not reproduced because it is a time consuming and tedious job. The
SmartLogic lowers the effort needed to mount such an attack and makes it easier to
verify published results.
Another option for an active attack is to completely replace the terminal by a
modified version. This is what happened at branches of the ABN AMRO bank in
The Netherlands during 2008 and 2009 3. Criminals replaced e.dentifiers, handheld
readers that are used for online banking, in the bank with their own modified ver-
sions. The modified devices functioned like the original devices, but had some added
functionality. Next to computing the required response that had to be entered on the
bank’s website, they also stored the customer’s Personal Identification Number (PIN)
code and data to reconstruct the magnetic stripe of the card. This data could later be
collected by the criminals using a so-called ‘download card’, a specially programmed
smart card that was detected by the devices and to which all the saved data would
then be transferred. Using this data the criminals could create cloned cards that
would contain the correct data on the magnetic stripe and for which they would know
the PIN.
Apart from the communication we can also analyse physical properties of the card
during security sensitive operations, such as cryptographic computations. An example
of these passive side-channel attacks is the analysis of power usage using Simple Power
Analysis (SPA) or Differential Power Analysis (DPA), which could reveal key material
on the card [KJJ99]. Fault injections are a type of active side-channel attacks where
the attacker tries to influence the operation of a smart card [BECN+04]. This could
for example be done by glitching the voltage or clock supplied to the card. The goal
is then to skip instructions or make them produce wrong results, and use this to
circumvent security measures or learn sensitive data.
In this thesis we will focus on active attacks on protocol specifications and im-
plementations, where a possible MitM can change the communication. We research
systematic defences against these attacks by using both formal analysis of specifica-
3http://deeplink.rechtspraak.nl/uitspraak?id=ECLI:NL:RBROT:2011:BU6141 and http://
deeplink.rechtspraak.nl/uitspraak?id=ECLI:NL:RBROT:2011:BU6142
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tions and automated learning techniques to analyse implementations.
2.2 Automated analysis of security protocols
Designing and analysing security protocols is very error prone and difficult to do by
hand. Automated analysis can help here to perform a more systematic analysis and
reduce human errors. A typical example of the difficulty of analysis of security proto-
cols is the Needham-Schroeder protocol [NS78]. Though the protocol was published
in 1978, it wasn’t until 1995 when Lowe found an attack against the protocol and
later showed an automated analysis on it that found the attack [Low95,Low96]. For
this work Lowe used a generic model checker. Nowadays, a lot of tools exist that are
specifically designed to analyse security protocols. One example of a tool that can be
used to analyse specifications of security protocols is ProVerif, which we will discuss
below [Bla01]. To analyse implementations of security protocols we make use of the
automated learning techniques that are introduced in Section 2.3.
2.2.1 Attacker models
When analysing security protocols we need to define the attacker model, i.e. the
capabilities that an attacker has to attack a protocol. The attacker model that is used
most is the so-called Dolev-Yao attacker [DY83]. This attacker is assumed to control
the communication medium. This means he can change, drop or inject messages.
However, he is computationally bounded as it is assumed that he cannot break the
cryptographic operations. More specifically, he cannot perform any cryptographic
operation without knowing the correct key.
2.2.2 ProVerif
ProVerif is an automated protocol analyser that makes use of resolution of Horn
clauses for its analysis [Bla01]. Several input formats can be used to provide the
specifications, but we will only consider the extension of the untyped pi-calculus as
introduced in [AB05a] and depicted in Figure 2.1.
No built-in cryptographic operations are provided, so these have to be defined
using constructors and destructors. This results in cryptographic operations that
are assumed to be perfect, i.e. data cannot be decrypted without knowledge of the
correct key and neither can signatures be computed without this knowledge. Due to
some approximations, the tool can handle an unbounded number of sessions and an
unbounded message space. The drawback of this is that ProVerif might return false
attacks or is not able to answer queries at all. However, if it reports that there a
security property holds this is correct. In the analysis, two types of attackers can be
considered: an active attacker, that is equal to a Dolev-Yao attacker, or a passive
attacker, that only monitors the public communication channels but cannot modify
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M, N ::= term
x, y, z variable
a, b, c, k, s name
f(M1, ..., Mn) constructor application
P, Q ::= processes
out M(N).P output
in M(x).P input
0 nil
P—Q parallel composition
!P replication
(new a).P restriction
let x = g(M1, ... Mn) in P else Q destructor application
let x = M in P local definition
if M = N then P else Q conditional
Figure 2.1: Syntax of untyped pi-calculus used by ProVerif [AB05a]
or inject messages. If an attack is found, the tool will try to reconstruct an example
of an attack trace [AB05b].
ProVerif supports several types of queries to check security properties of protocols.
We will consider two types of queries in this thesis:
• secrecy: this is the most basic type of query and it is used to check if it is
possible for the attacker to learn the value of a given term.
• authentication: this type of query is used to check a relation between different
events. Two types of queries exist to check this. The first is of the form
ev:EventA() ==> ev:EventB()
This query checks that if event EventA is executed, then event EventB was
executed before.
The second type of query that can be verified is
evinj:EventA() ==> evinj:EventB()
In this case, for every execution of event EventB there exists a distinct executed
event EventA that was executed before.
2.2.3 FS2PV
At Microsoft Research, the tool FS2PV was developed [BFGT08]. This tool can be
used to convert F# code – a functional programming language developed by Microsoft
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– to the untyped pi-calculus that is used as input to ProVerif. Though only a subset
of F# can be used, this already provides much more flexibility by the use of functions
and sequential if-statements.
2.3 Automated learning
Finite state machines (a.k.a. finite automata) are a very useful formalism to model the
behaviour of systems. For security-sensitive systems, they can be used to confirm that
actions can only be carried out in the correct order, e.g. that some security-sensitive
action is only possible after a successful PIN code check. Implementing a security
protocol inevitably involves the implementation of a state machine that checks that
messages are only accepted in the correct order. Automatically learning these state
machines is a very useful technique that can be used to automatically reverse engineer
implementations of security protocols, with the view to find security flaws or confirm
their absence. The vulnerabilities that can be discovered using this technique are the
ones that occur when performing actions in an unexpected order, e.g. performing a
security sensitive operation before having entered a PIN code. On the other hand, we
cannot hope to discover carefully hidden backdoors in an implementation. Still, as
our experiments will confirm, we can hope to find accidental mistakes in the program
logic.
A widely used technique for creating a model from observations is regular inference,
also known as automata learning [Ang87]. The regular inference algorithm from
[Nie03, RSBM09] provides sequences of inputs to a System Under Test (SUT) and
observes the responses to infer a state machine as explained in Section 2.3.2. The
state machines that are inferred are Mealy machines, a special form of finite state
machines that will be explained in Section 2.3.1. In addition to standard learning
methods, abstraction techniques for data parameters [AJU10,ASV10] can be used to
learn a more detailed model of the system.
2.3.1 Mealy machines
We use Mealy machines to model the behaviour of smart cards. A Mealy machine is
a finite state machine where every transition involves an input and a resulting output.
Formally, a Mealy machine is a tuple M = 〈I, O,Q, q0, δ, λ〉, where I, O and Q are
nonempty sets of input symbols, output symbols, and states, respectively; q0 ∈ Q is
the initial state; δ : Q × I → Q is the transition function; and λ : Q × I → O is the
output function. Elements of I∗ and O∗ are input and output strings respectively.
An intuitive interpretation of a Mealy machine is as follows. At any point in time,
the machine is in some state q ∈ Q. It is possible to give inputs to the machine
by supplying an input symbol i ∈ I. The machine then responds by producing an
output symbol λ(q, i) and transforming itself to the new state δ(q, i). Let a transition
q
i/o
−→ q′ in M denote that δ(q, i) = q′ and λ(q, i) = o.
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The Mealy machines that we consider are complete and deterministic, meaning
that for each state q and input i exactly one next state δ(q, i) and output symbol
λ(q, i) is possible.
2.3.2 Inference of Mealy machines
Angluin’s well-known L* [Ang87] is an active learning algorithm to infer deterministic
finite automata. Inspired by work of Angluin, Niese [Nie03] developed an adapta-
tion of the L* algorithm for active learning of deterministic Mealy machines. The
algorithm assumes there is a Teacher, who knows a deterministic Mealy machine
M = 〈I, O,Q, q0, δ, λ〉, and a Learner, who initially has no knowledge about M, ex-
cept for its sets I and O of input and output symbols. Whenever the Teacher accepts
an input symbol on M, it maintains the current state of M, which at the beginning
equals the initial state q0. The Learner can ask three types of queries to the Teacher :
• An output query i ∈ I. Upon receiving output query i, the Teacher picks a
transition q
i/o
→ q′, where q is the current state, returns output o ∈ O as answer
to the Learner, and updates its current state to q′.
• A reset query. Upon receiving a reset query the Teacher resets its current state
to q0.
• An equivalence query H, whereH is a hypothesised Mealy machine. The Teacher
will answer yes if H is correct, that is, whether H is equivalent to M, or else
supply a counterexample, which is a string u ∈ I∗ such that u produces a
different output string for both automata, i.e., λM(u) 6= λH(u).
When it comes to answering equivalence queries, there are two possibilities. In
a white-box setting, the teacher is assumed to know the internal implementation of
M, so that he can simply see if the hypothesis automaton is correct. In a black-box
setting, the teacher cannot access the internal implementation; then the teacher can
only resort to black-box testing of the target to see if he can observe a difference. In
such cases, the equivalence query can only be approximated, namely by testing to see
if a difference between the actual machineM and the hypothesis H can be detected.
(Note that this is a form of model-based testing.) As we will discuss in Section 2.3.3,
there are different strategies to test the equivalence.
Note that in a black-box setting, equivalence queries cannot be answered with
certainty: there may be differences between the hypothesis and the real implemen-
tation that do not show up in the finite number of tests that are run. For example,
we cannot exclude the possibility that if we keep repeating some input many times,
the real implementation will do something different than the hypothesis automaton
on the millionth time. The automaton that is ultimately inferred might only show a
subset of the actual behaviour.
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The typical behaviour of a Learner is to start by asking sequences of output queries
(alternated with resets) until a “stable” hypothesis H can be built from the answers.
After that an equivalence query is made to find out whetherH is correct. If the answer
is yes then the Learner has succeeded. Otherwise the returned counterexample is
used to perform subsequent output queries until converging to a new hypothesised
automaton, which is supplied in an equivalence query, etc.
2.3.3 LearnLib
The LearnLib tool provides a Java implementation of the adapted L* algorithm
[RSBM09]. Because LearnLib views the SUT as a black box, equivalence queries can
only be approximated. The tool provides several different realisations for checking
equivalence queries.
To approximate equivalence checking of the teacher, we use either the random
walk method or Chow’s W-method [Cho78] as provided by LearnLib. For the random
walk method, LearnLib will try to verify a hypothesis by generating random input
traces and checking the corresponding outputs from the device against the hypothesis.
The maximum number of traces is given, as well as a minimum and maximum trace
length. When using the W-method it can be guaranteed that, given an upper bound
on the number of states, the correct state machine is found. This does come at a cost
of a possibly much longer running time compared to the random walk method and
requires an upper bound to be specified. In practice we usually first use the random
walk method to get an upper bound for the number of states. This is then used to
perform an analysis using the W-method and to verify the results of the random walk
method.
Chapter 3
EMV
EMV is the world’s leading standard for payments with smart cards. The initiative
for EMV was taken by Europay, MasterCard and Visa in 1994 and the first version
was released in 1996. Since 1999, the EMV specifications are maintained by EMVCo,
a company currently jointly owned by American Express, Discover, JCB, MasterCard,
UnionPay and Visa. According to EMVCo, the number of EMV cards in use at the
moment is over 1.5 billion. In Europe the shift to EMV was partly driven by the
Single Euro Payment Area (SEPA), which requires compliance with EMV in their
SEPA Cards Framework [Cou09]. In The Netherlands, all bank cards issued are
EMV-compliant.
The EMV specification is publicly available and consists of four books [EMV11a,
EMV11b, EMV11c, EMV11d], amounting to over 700 pages. These books do not
define a single protocol, but a highly configurable toolkit for payment protocols. For
instance, it allows a choice between:
• three Card Authentication Methods (CAMs): Static Data Authentication (SDA),
Dynamic Data Authentication (DDA), and Combined Data Authentication
(CDA), discussed in more detail in Section 3.1;
• five Cardholder Verification Methods (CVMs): none, signature, online PIN, of-
fline plaintext PIN, and oﬄine encrypted PIN;
• on- and off-line transactions.
Moreover, many of these options are again parameterised, as explained in Section 3.1,
possibly using proprietary data and formats. All these options and parameterisations
make the EMV standard very difficult to comprehend.
The Common Core Definition (CCD) was added to the EMV standard in 2004 and
specifies a set of minimum implementation options and configurations for cards that
are sufficient to perform an EMV transaction. It is included in the EMV specifications.
In addition to CCD a separate specification was released by EMVCo in 2005 called the
Common Payment Application (CPA) [EMV05]. In this specification data elements
and functionalities for an EMV card application are described that comply with CCD.
A card that complies with CPA would be accepted to be used for all international
card schemes, such as MasterCard and Visa. Before CPA was released, every payment
scheme had its own proprietary specification that cards should comply to. Now,
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issuers who want to be able to use the same application for different payment schemes
only have to make sure it is compliant with the CPA.
3.1 EMV fundamentals
This section explains the basic building blocks of EMV and some central concepts
and terminology. In EMV several entities can be identified. First, we have the
customer (also known as cardholder in the EMV specifications) who is in possession
of his EMV-compliant bank card issued by his bank (also called the issuer). The
customer can use the card to perform a transaction at a merchant. The merchant
has a terminal, called a POS, that can communicate with the customer’s card. The
terminal also communicates with the merchant’s bank (also called the acquirer), who
has to authorise and perform the actual transaction. Another type of terminal is an
ATM, where the user can use his card to withdraw cash. For an ATM the acquirer is
the bank owning the ATM or the bank of the company owning the ATM. Terminals
are trusted to provide the customer with secure input (a keypad that is trusted to
enter the PIN code) and output (a display that is trusted to show transaction details).
Key setup
The essence of the key setup in EMV is as follows, making use of derived session keys
and a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI):
• Every card has a unique symmetric key KAC that it shares with the issuer. This
is typically a diversified key derived from a master key known only by the issuer.
Using this key a session key KSAC = encKAC (ATC) can be computed, which is
used to authorise transactions. The Application Transaction Counter (ATC) is
a counter that is increased on every initialisation. This key derivation method
for session keys is not mandatory for EMV and issuers can implement their own
methods.
• The Certificate Authority (CA) has a public-private key pair (PKCA, SKCA).
This public key PKCA is known to the terminal.
• The issuer has a public-private key pair (PKI , SKI) and a certificate for this
key pair signed by the CA. On all cards, the certificate of its issuer is present.
• Cards that support asymmetric cryptography also have a public-private key pair
(PKICC , SKICC) and a certificate for this key pair signed by the issuer. Most
cards in use nowadays will have support for asymmetric cryptography. This key
pair is used to authenticate a card to terminals and to encrypt PIN codes that
are sent to the card.
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Payment scheme owners, such as MasterCard and Visa, act as CAs and provide the
certificates for the issuers. This key setup is the basis of trust between the different
parties.
This setup provides cards with two mechanisms to prove authenticity of data:
• All EMV cards can compute Message Authentication Codes (MACs) on mes-
sages, using the symmetric (session) keys shared with the issuing bank. The
issuer can check these MACs to verify authenticity of the messages, but the
terminal cannot as it does not know the shared symmetric keys KAC or KSAC .
• Cards that support asymmetric cryptography can also digitally sign data to
prove the authenticity to the terminal, as well as to the issuer.
Cardholder authentication methods
The EMV standard defines three authentication mechanisms for a card to prove its
authenticity to terminals: SDA, DDA, and CDA.
• SDA (Static Data Authentication): the card provides some digitally signed data
(e.g. the card number and expiry date) to the terminal to authenticate itself.
The data is signed by the issuer and can thus be used by cards that do not
support asymmetric cryptography. The terminal can check the authenticity of
this data, since it can retrieve the issuer’s public key. However, as all the data
that is signed is static, this method does not rule out cloning.
• DDA (Dynamic Data Authentication): the card proves its authenticity using a
challenge-response mechanism. This requires the card to support asymmetric
cryptography and have a public/private key pair. The card signs, using its
private key, a challenge chosen by the terminal and a nonce generated by the
card. The nonce generated by the card is stored in the terminal for possible
later use during the transaction. The challenge from the terminal is required
to include an unpredictable number, which should rule out cloning. However,
after the data authentication, DDA does not tie the subsequent transaction to a
specific card as far as the terminal can determine. In other words, the terminal
cannot verify that the transaction was actually carried out by the same card as
the data authentication.
• CDA (Combined Data Authentication): repairs this deficiency of DDA. With
CDA the card digitally signs all important transaction data, not only authenti-
cating the card, but also authenticating any transaction it performs.
The data that is authenticated with SDA, referred to in the standard as Static Data to
be Authenticated, is also authenticated with DDA or CDA. For these authentication
methods a hash over this data is included in the certificate containing the public
key of the card. In this sense DDA and CDA subsume SDA. All Dutch cards we
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have seen are capable of performing DDA. Cards that support CDA we have not
seen yet, even though any card that can do DDA are technically also capable of
performing CDA. Both Visa and MasterCard did not allow new SDA cards to be
issued after the beginning of 2011 and no more SDA should be in use anymore from
2015 [Vis11,Mas11].
Data object lists
An important concept in the EMV specification is that of Data Object Lists (DOLs),
that are used to ‘configure’ various EMV commands. A DOL specifies a list of data
elements, and the format of such a list. Example data elements are the card’s ATC,
the transaction amount, the currency, the country code, and card- or terminal-chosen
nonces.
An EMV card supplies several DOLs to the terminal. Different DOLs specify
which data the card expects as inputs in particular protocol steps (and then also the
format that this data has to be in). This is explained in more detail in Section 3.2.
The use of these DOLs make EMV highly parameterisable. The choices for DOLs are
of crucial importance for the overall security, as they control which data gets signed or
MACed, and hence no security analysis is possible without making some assumptions
on the DOLs.
3.2 An EMV protocol session
An EMV protocol session can roughly be divided into five steps:
1. initialisation: selection of the application on the smart card and reading of some
data;
2. (optionally) data authentication, i.e. authentication of the card, by means of
SDA, DDA, or CDA;
3. (optionally) cardholder verification, by means of PIN or signature;
4. the actual transaction;
5. (optionally) script processing: the terminal may send additional Issuer-to-Card
scripting commands, that allow the issuer to update cards in the field.
Each of these steps is described in more detail below. Here we use the usual semi-
formal Alice-Bob style for security protocols, where square brackets indicate optional
(parts of) messages. The card is here denoted by C, and the terminal by T. In
Figure 3.1, an overview is given for an EMV session.
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Initialisation (Section 3.2.1)
[Data authentication (Section 3.2.2)]
[Cardholder verification (Section 3.2.3)]
Terminal action analysis (Section 3.2.4)
[Script processing (Section 3.2.5)]
Generate first cryptogram: TC, ARQC or AAC (Section 3.2.4)
[External authenticate (Section 3.2.4)]
[Script processing (Section 3.2.5)]
[Generate second cryptogram: TC or AAC (Section 3.2.4)]
[Script processing (Section 3.2.5)]
Figure 3.1: Different steps in an EMV session with the corresponding sections. Op-
tional parts are indicated by square brackets.
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T → C: SELECT APPLICATION
C → T: [PDOL]
T → C: GET PROCESSING OPTIONS, [(Data specified by the PDOL)]
C → T: (AIP, AFL)
Repeat for all files in the AFL:
T → C: READ RECORD, i
C → T: (Contents of file i)
Figure 3.2: Initialisation of an EMV session
3.2.1 Initialisation
In the first phase of an EMV session, the terminal obtains basic information about the
card (such as card number and expiry date) and the information about the features
the card supports and their configurations. This is information the terminal needs
for the subsequent steps in the EMV session. Optionally, the card may require some
information from the terminal. In Figure 3.2 the protocol steps are given for the
initialisation, which will be explained in more detail below.
The protocol starts by selecting the payment application. In response to the
SELECT APPLICATION command, the card optionally provides a Processing Options
Data Object List (PDOL). The PDOL specifies which data, if any, the card wants
from the terminal; this could for instance include the Terminal Country Code or the
amount. Note that none of this data is authenticated.
The card then provides its Application Interchange Profile (AIP) and the Appli-
cation File Locator (AFL). The AIP consists of two bytes indicating the supported
features (SDA, DDA, CDA, cardholder verification and issuer authentication) and
whether terminal risk management should be performed. During the terminal risk
management, the terminal will decide whether to perform the transaction online based
on, e.g., the amount of the transaction and the last time the card was used in an online
transaction.
The AFL is a list identifying the files on the card to be used in the transaction.
For each file it is indicated whether it is included in the data authentication as will be
explained in Section 3.2.2. The files can be read using the READ RECORD command.
Some additional data that is not present in the files, like the PIN try counter, can be
retrieved using the GET DATA command, if supported by the card.
The following data objects are mandatory to be included in the files on the card:
• Application Expiry Date,
• Application Primay Account Number (PAN),
• Card Risk Management Data Object List 1 (CDOL1), and
• Card Risk Management Data Object List 2 (CDOL2).
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For cards that support SDA the Signed Static Application Data (SSAD) is also manda-
tory.
Note that none of the data provided by the card or by the terminal is authen-
ticated yet at this stage. The process of card authentication, discussed below, will
authenticate some of the data provided by the card.
3.2.2 Card authentication
As already mentioned, there are three card authentication methods. The AIP informs
the terminal which methods are supported by the card, and the terminal should then
choose the ‘highest’ method that both the card and the terminal support.
Static Data Authentication (SDA)
On cards that support SDA, the SSAD is the signed hash of the concatenation of
the files indicated by the AFL, optionally followed by the value of the AIP. Whether
the AIP is included is indicated by the optional Static Data Authentication Tag List,
which can be included in one of the files. The signature in the SSAD is created by the
issuer, whose certificate is also on the card. For SDA no additional communication
is needed, since the data needed to verify the SSAD was already retrieved in the
initialisation phase.
Dynamic Data Authentication (DDA)
DDA consists of two steps and requires some additional communication, as can be
seen in Figure 3.3. First, the certificate containing the card’s public key is checked.
This certificate also contains the hash of the Static Data to be Authenticated, that is
also authenticated with SDA.
Second, a challenge-response protocol is performed. To provide the challenge
an INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command is sent to the card. The argument of this
command is the data specified by the Dynamic Data Authentication Data Object
List (DDOL). The DDOL can be supplied by the card, otherwise a default DDOL
should be present in the terminal. The DDOL always has to contain at least a
terminal-generated nonce (the Unpredictable Number (UN)).
The Signed Dynamic Application Data (SDAD) is the signed ICC Dynamic Data
and hash of the ICC Dynamic Data and the data specified by the DDOL. The ICC
Dynamic Data contains at least the ICC Dynamic Number , a time-variant parameter
like a nonce or a counter. On the bank and credit cards we studied, the DDOL only
specified the Unpredictable Number, and the ICC Dynamic Data only consisted of
the ICC Dynamic Number.
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T → C: INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE, (Data specified by DDOL)
C → T: signSKICC( ICC Dynamic Data,
H(ICC Dynamic Data, Data specified by DDOL))
Figure 3.3: DDA protocol step
Combined Data Authentication (CDA)
Card authentication using CDA does not require additional messages, but is combined
with the actual transaction, which will be explained in Section 3.2.4. As with DDA,
the Static Data to be Authenticated is authenticated using the certificate for the
public key of the card.
With CDA, the SDAD is a signature on the ICC Dynamic Data and the UN:
SDAD = signSKICC ( ICC Dynamic Data,
H(ICC Dynamic Data, Unpredictable Number))
The ICC Dyamic Data will always include at least the ICC Dynamic Number, the
Cryptogram Information Data (CID), the cryptogram and the Transaction Data Hash
Code (TDHC). The TDHC is a hash of the elements specified by the PDOL, the
elements specified by the CDOL1 or CDOL2 and the elements returned by the card
in the response.
3.2.3 Cardholder verification
Cardholder verification can be done in several ways: by a PIN, a handwritten sig-
nature, or it can simply not be done. The process to decide which CVM is used –
if any – is quite involved. The card provides the terminal with its CVM List, that
specifies under which conditions which CVMs are acceptable. The CVM List starts
with two values that can be used to specify thresholds for transaction amounts. These
values are followed by the CV Rules, a list specifying which CVM to use under which
conditions. These rules can refer to the first two values in the CVM List and are
in order of decreasing preference. Examples of possible conditions are ‘If terminal
supports the CVM’ and ‘If unattended cash’. The terminal chooses the CVM to be
used based on the transaction details, its own capabilities and the card’s preferences.
In all Dutch bank cards we inspected, the CVM List is included in the Static Data
to be Authenticated.
If cardholder verification is done by means of a PIN, there are three options:
• online PIN, in which case the bank checks the PIN;
• oﬄine plaintext PIN, in which case the card checks the PIN, and the PIN is
transmitted to the card in the clear;
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T → C: VERIFY, pin
C → T: Success / (PIN failed, tries left) / Failed
Figure 3.4: Protocol step for oﬄine plaintext PIN verification
T → C: GET CHALLENGE
C → T: ICC Dynamic Number
T → C: VERIFY, encPKICC ((pin, ICCDynamicNumber, random padding))
C → T: Success / (PIN failed, tries left) / Failed
Figure 3.5: Protocol steps for oﬄine enciphered PIN verification
• oﬄine enciphered PIN, in which case the card checks the PIN, and the PIN is
encrypted before it is sent to the card.
Note that the card is only involved in cardholder verification in case of oﬄine –
plaintext or encrypted – PIN, as detailed below. Encrypting the PIN requires a
card that supports asymmetric crypto. Online PIN verification is performed using a
different protocol between the terminal and the bank. In this case the card is not
involved in the cardholder verification.
Oﬄine plaintext PIN verification
With plaintext PIN verification the PIN code is sent in plain to the card as can be
seen in Figure 3.4. In its turn, the card will return an unauthenticated response
indicating whether the PIN was correct or how many failed PIN attempts there are
left before the card blocks.
Oﬄine enciphered PIN verification
If the verification is done using the encrypted PIN, the terminal first requests a nonce
from the card. Using the public key of the card, the terminal encrypts the PIN
together with the nonce and some random padding created by the terminal. The
result of the verification is then returned unauthenticated to the terminal as with the
plaintext PIN verification. In Figure 3.5 the protocol steps for this method are given.
3.2.4 The transaction
After the optional card authentication and card holder verification, the actual trans-
action is performed. Transactions can be either oﬄine or online. The terminal chooses
which it wants to use, but the card may refuse to do a transaction oﬄine and force
the terminal to do an online transaction instead.
For a transaction the card generates one or two cryptograms: one in the case of
an oﬄine transaction, and two in the case of an online transaction.
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• In an oﬄine transaction the card provides a proof to the terminal that a transac-
tion took place by means of a Transaction Certificate (TC), which the terminal
sends to the issuer later.
• In an online transaction the card first provides an Authorisation Request Cryp-
togram (ARQC) which the terminal forwards to the issuer for approval. If the
card receives approval, the card then provides a TC as proof that the transaction
has been completed.
In both on- and oﬄine transactions the card can also choose to refuse or abort the
transaction, in which case an Application Authentication Cryptogram (AAC) is pro-
vided instead of a TC or ARQC.
Below we first discuss how exceptions that occur can influence the type of cryp-
togram that is requested and the different types of cryptograms in more detail, before
we describe the protocol steps for off- and online transactions.
Terminal action analysis
During the terminal action analysis, the terminal decided whether a transaction
should be performed online or be aborted in case of the occurrence of an excep-
tion. When an exception occurs at the side of the terminal, such as, for example,
a failed data authentication or unsuccessful cardholder verification, this is stored in
the Terminal Verification Results (TVR). The TVR is a bit-string, where every ex-
ception corresponds to a particular bit. When an exception occurs the corresponding
bit in the TVR is set to 1 by the terminal. To specify what the terminal should do
in case of exceptions EMV makes use of so-called Action Codes. An Action Code is
a bit-string similar to the TVR. Both the issuer and the acquirer can indicate their
preferred actions specified in the Issuer Action Codes (IACs) and Terminal Action
Codes (TACs) respectively. We can distinguish three different types of action codes:
Denial, Online and Default. If no TACs are present, they have a default value of all
bits set to 0. The default value for IAC - Denial is all 0s, whereas the IAC - Online
and IAC - Default are all 1s by default. The Action Codes are processed in pairs by
the terminal in the following order:
• Denial, if an exception occurred and the corresponding bit is 1 in either the TAC
- Denial or IAC - Denial, the terminal will abort the transaction by requesting
an AAC.
• Online, if the terminal supports online transaction and an exception occurred
for which the corresponding bit is 1 in either the TAC - Online or IAC - Online,
the terminal will force the transaction to be performed online by requesting an
ARQC.
• Default, if the terminal does not support online transaction or it was unable to
go online, and an exception occurs for which the corresponding bit is 1 in either
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the TAC - Default or IAC - Default, the transaction will be aborted by the
terminal by requesting an AAC. If the transaction is not aborted, the terminal
will try to complete an oﬄine transaction by requesting a TC.
Cryptograms
Using the GENERATE AC command, the terminal can ask the card to compute one of
the types of cryptograms mentioned above, i.e. TC, ARQC or AAC.
Arguments of the GENERATE AC command tell the card which type of cryptograms
to produce and whether CDA has to be used. Additional arguments that have to be
supplied by the terminal are specified by CDOL1 and CDOL2. CDA is only performed
on TC or ARQC messages, and not on AAC messages.
The response always contains
• the Cryptogram Information Data (CID), indicating the Application Cryp-
togram (AC) type in the response,
• the Application Transaction Counter (ATC) and
• an Application Cryptogram (AC) or proprietary cryptogram.
Optionally, the response may contain
• the Issuer Application Data (IAD),
• other proprietary data,
• the Signed Dynamic Application Data (SDAD), namely if CDA is requested
and the type of the response cryptogram is not AAC.
The cryptogram returned by the card can either be in the format specified in the
EMV standard, or in a proprietary format. Additionally, if CDA is used, the card also
returns the SDAD over the response using its private key SKICC so that the terminal
can check the authenticity of the complete message. If no CDA is performed, the
response to a GENERATE AC command consists of the CID, the ATC, the AC and
optionally the IAD. When performing CDA, the AC is replaced by the SDAD.
Both the CDOL1 and CDOL2 are required to always include the UN. A Card
Risk Management Data Object List (CDOL) might request a Transaction Certificate
Hash, which is a hash on the elements in the Transaction Certificate Data Object
List (TDOL). The TDOL might be provided by the card, or a default can be used
that is specified by the payment system.
The GENERATE AC command starts with a parameter indicating the type of AC
that is requested. The boolean parameter cda requested specifies whether a CDA
signature is requested. This results in the protocol step given in Figure 3.6. For an
oﬄine transaction this is the only step to confirm the transaction by requesting a TC.
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T → C: GENERATE AC, (ac type, cda requested, data specified by the CDOL1)
C → T: (CID, ATC, AC, [IAD])
Figure 3.6: Protocol step for a single GENERATE AC command
T → C: GENERATE AC, (ARQC, cda requested, data specified by the CDOL1)
C → T: (CID, ATC, AC, [IAD])
T: Communication with issuer to retrieve issuer authentication data
T → C: EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE, (issuer authentication data)
C → T: Success/ Failed
T → C: GENERATE AC, (TC, cda requested, data specified by the CDOL2)
C → T: (CID, ATC, AC, [IAD])
Figure 3.7: Protocol steps for an online transaction using the EXTERNAL
AUTHENTICATE command
After forwarding the ARQC in an online transaction, the terminal might receive
the Issuer Authentication Data in response from the issuer. If supported by the card,
this data is sent to the card using the EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command to which
the card responds whether the issuer authentication was successful (see Figure 3.7).
If the EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command is not supported by the card, the Issuer
Authentication Data can still be included in the CDOL2 for the card to authenticate
the issuer. How the issuer is exactly authenticated is out of scope of the EMV spec-
ifications. After the card returns a TC the transaction is confirmed (and the money
or goods handed over to the customer), even though the TC might not have been
forwarded to the bank yet.
3.2.5 Script processing
A terminal might receive one or more Issuer Scripts from the issuer. This is a list of
APDUs, called Issuer Script Commands, to be sent to the card. A script can specify
whether this should be done either before or after the final GENERATE AC command.
These commands are used to perform operations on the card that are not provided
by the EMV specifications, for example, to update the PIN code on the card. For
security sensitive operations, the EMV specification gives several ways to perform
Secure Messaging.
3.3 Known attacks
EMV offers a lot of options which gives it great flexibility and introduces a lot of
potential security problems at the same time. Some weaknesses of certain EMV
configurations are widely known and apparently accepted – at least by some issuers.
Next, the currently known attacks will be discussed.
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3.3.1 Relay attack
With a relay attack, communication between a card and terminal is –as the name
already suggests– relayed by the attacker. A terminal, controlled by the attacker,
talks to the genuine card and relays the communication to an emulator card that is
inserted into a genuine terminal. This means the genuine card and terminal are not
necessarily at the same place when a transaction is performed. A customer could, for
example, think he is paying for a small item in an attacker’s grocery store, while the
POS actually relays the communication with the card to a jewellery shop where an
accomplice buys some expensive jewellery [DM07]. This attack can be used on almost
all smart card based systems, as you basically only ‘extend’ the connection between
the card and terminal. For contact based smart cards you still have to wait for the user
to insert his card in a compromised terminal that can relay the communication. For
contactless smart cards this becomes easier as you only need to get a reader close to
a card to be able to communicate with it. These readers are becoming more common
as they are included in many smartphones today. To counter a relay attack using
cheap hardware, such as smartphones, we propose a simple modification to the EMV
protocol used in these cards in [CGR+15]. This modification relies on the fact that a
relay introduces some noticeable overhead in the timings of the communication.
3.3.2 Cloning SDA cards
With SDA, only static data on the card is authenticated. This means a terminal won’t
be able to determine whether the card is actually present or the data is replayed. It
is thus possible to copy the data from a genuine card and create a clone. Since the
cryptograms are generated using a secret key that is only known to the card and the
issuer, the terminal won’t be able to determine whether a transaction was successful
before it sends the cryptogram to the bank. A cloned SDA card can therefore be
used to perform oﬄine transaction. However, as soon as the merchant tries to get his
money by sending the cryptogram to the issuer, the issuer will deny the transaction
as the cryptogram is not valid.
3.3.3 DDA wedge attack
DDA authenticates the card using a challenge-response mechanism as opposed to
only static data as with SDA. However, this does not tie the card to the subsequent
transaction. After the authentication of the card, an attacker could thus take over the
communication and send fake cryptograms. If the transaction is performed oﬄine, the
terminal is not able to verify correctness of the cryptograms. For this attack, access
to a real card is necessary to successfully complete the card authentication phase. By
faking the cryptogram, the merchant will not be able to get his money, as with the
cloned SDA cards.
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3.3.4 No-PIN attack
In [MDAB10], Murdoch et al. describe an attack that works with online transactions.
They present a MitM attack that makes use of the fact that the response to the VERIFY
command for oﬄine verification of the PIN is not authenticated. The attacker will let
the transaction proceed as usual by forwarding all commands and responses between
the terminal and card except when it sees a VERIFY command. In this case, he will
not forward the command to the card but respond by sending 9000 as a response,
indicating verification of the PIN code was successful. Even though the issuer and the
card know that no actual PIN verification took place, the terminal has no way to detect
this using the data that is provided in compliance with the EMV specification. The
terminal will therefore conclude the verification was successful and will print ’Verified
by PIN’ on the paper receipt printed by the POS. This attack can be prevented in
online transactions. For example, Dutch bank cards include the CVM Results in the
ARQC that is forwarded to the bank. Should the issuer detect that no PIN code was
entered at all they can decide to abort the transaction.
3.3.5 Fallback to plaintext PIN
Barisani et al. presented a MitM attack to force a fallback from encrypted PIN to
plaintext PIN, making it possible for an attacker intercepting the traffic to learn the
PIN code [BBLF11]. Their attack makes use of the way Issuer Action Codes are used
by the terminal. By modifying the CVM List that is sent by the card, they change
the preferred CVM to plaintext PIN. If the CVM List is part of the Static Data to be
Authenticated, this can be detected by the terminal during the data authentication.
However, one of the exceptions that is listed in the Action Codes is whether data
authentication failed. This means that the terminal decides what to do after the data
authentication failed based on the Terminal Action Codes and Issuer Action Codes.
The attacker also changes the IACs that are sent by the card to not deny a transaction
if data authentication failed, but to request an online transaction. As the terminal
has no way to authenticate the IACs, it will use those provided by the attacker. If
failed data authentication is not set in the TACs Denial, the terminal will perform the
transaction online and continue with the data modified by the attacker. The terminal
will therefore send the PIN in plaintext over the line to the card. Through the CVM
Results the issuer will know that the PIN was sent in the clear, but only after the
attacker already learnt it.
The fact that the terminal will still continue the transaction after the data au-
thentication failed is a bit weird, even though the transaction needs to be performed
online in this case. Apparently availability is considered to be more important than
security in this case.
We repeated the attack and used the SmartLogic tool to intercept and modify the
communication between a POS terminal in a shop in the Netherlands and a Dutch
bank card [KGR12]. After the presentation by Barisani et al. the Dutch banks rolled
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out a fix to their terminals to prevent the attack. Our test, however, revealed that
even after the Dutch banks took countermeasures, there were still terminals that were
susceptible to this attack. Although the transaction was denied by the back-end and
the attack was quickly detected by the bank, the modification of the data still resulted
in a plaintext PIN code transmission to the card.
3.3.6 Pre-play attack
In [BCM+14], Bond et al. show what can happen if the Unpredictable Number gen-
erated by the terminal is not really unpredictable. The UN is the only data field
that provides freshness for a transaction from the side of the terminal as the other
data fields, such as the transaction amount or country code, could be determined in
advance. In their research they found several ATMs for which the UN was either
completely or partially predictable because, for example, it was based on a counter or
timestamps. Knowing the UN enables an attacker to harvest valid ARQCs or TCs,
depending on whether the transaction is online or oﬄine respectively. For example,
a malicious POS could harvest a number of ARQCs from a card that is used to pay
in a shop. Later the attacker can use the harvested data in an Automatic Teller
Machine (ATM) for which he can predict the UN to successfully withdraw money.
He won’t be able to generate a valid TC as this is based on the issuer’s response to
the ARQC, which cannot as easily be predicted. This might not be a problem as the
terminal cannot verify the TC itself and it could be the case that the TC is not imme-
diately sent to the issuer for verification. If CDA is used, this attack would not work
for online transactions as the attacker would need a signature on the TC, which would
be checked by the terminal. If the customer uses his card before the attacker tries to
withdraw money using the customer’s data, the last used ATC that is known by the
issuer will be higher than the ones in the ARQCs that the attacker harvested. If the
attacker now tries to use the harvested data, the issuer is able to detect that data is
replayed, as the ATC only increases. Also, depending on the number of ARQCs the
attacker harvests, a big gap between the last successfully used ATC and the current
one is used. This could be an indication to the issuer that there is a problem, but it
can also be caused by failed transactions.
In a Specification Bulletin, EMVCo announced that additional requirements for
the UN would be introduced [EMV12]. Terminal vendors are required to produce
UNs that are actually unpredictable. One suggestion for this is to follow international
standards for random number generation.

Chapter 4
Analysing EMV
As seen in the previous chapter, EMV is a complex standard with many options. In
this chapter we present our formal analysis of these specifications in Section 4.1 as
published in [RP12]. To analyse implementations of EMV we used automated learning
techniques on real bank cards, as discussed in Section 4.2 and published in [ARP13].
4.1 Formal analysis
In this section we will discuss the formal analysis we performed on the EMV pro-
tocol suite [RP12]. For the analysis we make use of the ProVerif tool discussed in
Section 2.2.2. Due to the complexity of the EMV specification, we wrote the model
in F# and used the tool FS2PV (see Section 2.2.3) to translate our F# model to
the untyped pi-calculus that is used by ProVerif. The model grows substantially in
size with this translation: whereas the F# model is 370 lines of code, the resulting
ProVerif model is 2527 lines of code. The increase in size is caused by the many if-
statements in the F# model – which result in duplication of large fragments of code
in the untyped pi-calculus – and the (convenient) use of functions in F#. In fact,
initially we tried to formalise the EMV protocol in the untyped pi-calculus, but we
gave up as the model became too complex to oversee.
Our model includes a card and a terminal. The issuer is not considered in this
model as it is not needed for the security requirements we consider in Section 4.1.4.
The F# code models a card that performs a single transaction. For most security
properties we want to consider cards performing multiple transactions. For this we
have to edit the generated ProVerif code, by simply adding ! for replication in the
right place.
We assume that the channel between the card and terminal is public, i.e. a Man-in-
the-Middle can intercept and modify all communication. Since the cards are provided
by the bank, we assume that there are no dishonest cards. The terminal is assumed to
have secure input and output with the customer. Our model makes some assumptions
on DOLs based on what we observed in Dutch bank and credit cards. Since we
do not know how the cryptogram is computed on the Dutch bank cards, we follow
the recommendations from the EMV specification. Here a MAC is computed using
the symmetric key SKSAC , which is shared between the card and the issuer, on
a minimum set of recommended data elements. The recommended minimum set of
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elements to be included in the AC is specified in [EMV11b, Section 8.1.1]. It consists of
the amount, terminal country, terminal verification results, currency, date, transaction
type, terminal nonce, AIP and ATC. The AIP and ATC are data provided by the
card, the other elements are provided by the terminal in the CDOL1 and CDOL2.
4.1.1 Card and terminal configuration options
For both card and terminal the model includes a number of boolean parameters that
describe their configuration parameters. For the card these parameters include
• sda, dda, cda: three booleans that define which card authentication mechanisms
are supported;
• force online: a boolean that determines whether the card will force the trans-
action to go online if the terminal starts an oﬄine transaction.
For the terminal these parameters include
• pin enabled: can the terminal check PIN codes?
• online enabled: is the transaction forced online by the terminal?
When analysing the model we have the choice between fixing certain values of
these parameters, or leaving them open. Advantage of the second approach is that
properties of multiple configurations can be verified in one go. Disadvantage is that
the model may be too complicated for ProVerif to verify (within a reasonable response
time), in which case some of these parameters should be fixed. For a bank issuing a
specific type of card, it would be fine to fix all the parameters for the card; still, one
should then consider all the possible terminal behaviours this card might encounter.
In our model, after the data has been read, the terminal optionally performs
card authentication and cardholder verification, and then, for a fresh card-generated
nonce and new value of the transaction counter, it provides at most two cryptograms
as requested by the terminal and described in Section 3.2.4: either just a TC or AAC,
or an ARQC followed by a TC, or an ARQC followed by an AAC.
4.1.2 DOLs
Although our model leaves many configuration options for card and terminal open,
as described above, the values of the DOLs have to be fixed and hard-coded in the
model. Given that the DOLs determine which data is signed or MACed in various
protocol steps, we cannot expect to do any security analysis without at least making
some minimal assumptions.
The DOLs in our model are based on what we observed on Dutch bank and credit
cards:
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• PDOL: the empty list
• DDOL: (Unpredictable Number)
• CDOL1: (amount, CVM Results, Unpredictable Number), where the CVM
Results contains the result of the cardholder verification.
• CDOL2: (Unpredictable Number)
• TDOL: not used
These are not the precise DOLs of the bank cards we looked at, but rather subsets
(or sub-lists) of them. For readability we omitted some of the data elements. For the
properties we wanted to verify, omitting these data elements is safe: if with the DOLs
above it is impossible to fake messages, then for DOLs with more data elements
– which would result in the inclusion of more data elements in digital signatures,
(signed) hashes or MACs – it is still impossible to fake messages.
4.1.3 Adding events to express security requirements
To express interesting security properties, our formal model is augmented with events
that mark important steps in the protocol by different participants. Without these, all
that can be verified are confidentiality properties, as these are ‘built-in’ to ProVerif.
Events added to the model are
• CardVerifyPIN(success): a failed or successful verification of the PIN code
by the card.
• TerminalVerifyPIN(success): a failed or successful verification of the PIN
code by the terminal.
• CardTransactionInit(atc,sda,dda,cda,pan): the card starting an EMV ses-
sion.
• TerminalSDA(success, pan), TerminalDDA(success, pan),
TerminalCDA(success, atc, ac type) and
TerminalCDA2(success,atc,ac type): a failed or successful data authentica-
tion by the terminal using SDA, DDA or CDA respectively.
• TerminalTransactionFinish(sda,dda,cda,pan,atc,success): the terminal
completing a transaction.
• CardTransactionFinish(sda,dda,cda,pan,atc,success): similarly, the card
completing a transaction.
Here success, sda, dda, cda, are boolean parameters to indicate success or failure
and describe the card authentication mechanism used, while atc and pan are inte-
ger parameters for the card’s Application Transaction Counter and Primay Account
Number.
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4.1.4 Security requirements
For our model we have verified three types of properties: sanity checks, secrecy re-
quirements, and, most interestingly of all, integrity and authenticity requirements.
Sanity checks
A silly mistake in the formal model could cause a deadlock, in some or all the branches
of the protocol, preventing these branches from ever being completed, and then mak-
ing some security properties for these branches trivially true. To detect this, we have
checked that all events are triggered, so it is possible to reach all events and hence
perform all possible variations of the protocol.
Confidentiality
The confidentiality requirements for EMV are the usual ones, namely confidentiality
of the private asymmetric keys and the shared symmetric keys.
Integrity and authenticity
Card authentication If the terminal successfully performs a card authentication,
it should be the highest card authentication method supported by both the card and
the terminal to rule out a forced fall-back, e.g. from DDA to SDA. To check this, we
verified the following two queries:
ev:TerminalSDA(True(),pan) ==>
ev:CardTransactionInit(atc,True(),False(),False(),pan)
and
ev:TerminalDDA(True(),pan) ==>
ev:CardTransactionInit(atc,sda,True(),False(),pan)
The PAN is unique for each card, so these queries express that if a terminal successfully
performs SDA or DDA this was the highest supported card authentication method.
Both queries are evaluated to true by ProVerif for multiple transactions per card, so
no fallback can be forced.
The particular EMV configuration that we model, based on our observations of
Dutch bank cards, is of importance here. The only reason that rollbacks of the card
authentication method are not possible is that the AIP, which contains the data
authentication methods that are supported by the card, is included in the data that
is authenticated as part of SDA, DDA and CDA.1
1Not including this AIP in the data that is authenticated is allowed by the EMV specifications,
but obviously a bad choice and one that the specification could warn against, or even disallow.
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To prevent replay, we also want the card to participate in each data authentication.
This is checked by using so-called injectivity in the queries:
evinj:TerminalSDA(True(),pan) ==>
evinj:CardTransactionInit(atc,sda,dda,cda,pan)
and
evinj:TerminalDDA(True(),pan) ==>
evinj:CardTransactionInit(atc,sda,dda,cda,pan)
These queries state that if a terminal completes an authentication, the corresponding
card (with that PAN) is in fact involved.
ProVerif was not able to prove the first query when considering multiple sessions
per card. However, with a single transaction per card the query evaluates to false.
If this query does not hold with a single session per card, it will also not hold with
multiple sessions per card. This result is as expected, as SDA allows replays as
discussed in Section 3.3.2. The second query could again be proved for multiple
sessions per card. This query evaluated to true, as the challenge-response mechanism
used in DDA prevents replays.
Customer authentication If the customer is authenticated using his PIN code,
the terminal and card should agree on whether the PIN was accepted or not. To
check this the following query is used:
evinj:TerminalVerifyPIN(True()) ==> evinj:CardVerifyPIN(True())
ProVerif indicates that this query is false. The root cause is that the response of the
card to an attempted (oﬄine) PIN verification is not authenticated, so a Man-in-the-
Middle attack could fake it. This weakness is exploited in the attack that is explained
in Section 3.3.4.
Transaction authenticity If a transaction is successfully completed by the termi-
nal, the corresponding card should also agree on having completed the transaction
successfully. This is checked using the following query:
evinj:TerminalTransactionFinish(sda,dda,cda,pan,atc,True())
==>
evinj:CardTransactionFinish(sda2,dda2,cda2,pan,atc,True())
Not surprisingly, this query evaluates to false, as both SDA and DDA do not
authenticate the transaction in any way that the terminal can verify (see the attacks
in Section 3.3.2 and Section 3.3.3).
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When using CDA, the card and terminal should agree on the result of the trans-
action, i.e. if CDA is successfully performed and the transaction is concluded with a
TC message at the terminal side, the card should also successfully have completed
the transaction. This is checked using the following queries:
evinj:TerminalCDA(True(),atc,DataTC()) ==>
evinj:CardTransactionFinish(sda,dda,cda,pan,atc,True())
and
evinj:TerminalCDA2(True(),atc,DataTC()) ==>
evinj:CardTransactionFinish(sda,dda,cda,pan,atc,True())
For both queries the result is true for cards with multiple transactions. Using CDA
thus guarantees that both the card and terminal agree on successful transactions.
4.1.5 Experiences using ProVerif
We ran ProVerif on a machine with an Intel Core i5-M540 processor at 2.53 GHz and
4GB of RAM memory. The running times for the final model range from 5 seconds
for the sanity checks to around 5 minutes for the more complex queries.
When constructing the model, usually ProVerif could verify the properties we were
interested in in a few minutes. Occasionally, it would take hours. To reduce the time
needed to verify, we removed types from the functions used and tried to reduce the
number of if-statements. Small changes in the F# model could result in quite different
ProVerif code. For example using a boolean condition b in an if-statement resulted at
one point in ProVerif not being able to compute the result within hours. Changing
the condition to b = true resulted in code being verified by ProVerif within minutes.
4.1.6 Including the issuer
When extending the model with the issuer we can check not only whether the card and
terminal agree on the details of the transaction, but also whether the issuer agrees.
This is for example interesting for online transactions, where the terminal relies on
the response by the issuer in accepting or denying the transaction. In an extension
of the previously discussed model we included the issuer in the code for the terminal,
as we assume the communication between the terminal and the issuer to be secure.
Since we did not know how the MACs in the cryptograms are actually computed
we used the recommended minimum set of elements to be included as specified in
the EMV standard [EMV11b, Section 8.1.1]. These included elements are amount,
terminal country, Terminal Verification Results, currency, date, transaction type, ter-
minal generated nonce, Application Interchange Profile and Application Transaction
Counter. Notice that the type of the cryptogram is not included in this set of data
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elements. This resulted in a new weakness found by ProVerif in our model. If a
transaction is declined by the card by sending an AAC to the terminal, a MitM could
change the type of the message to a TC. This would result in the terminal and issuer
accepting the transaction, though the card denied the transaction. This attack does
not work if CDA is used, as changing the message type would invalidate the signature
on the message. This is a theoretical weakness, as we do not know how the banks
implemented the actual construction of the cryptograms.
4.1.7 Conclusions
Our model covers all the important options for card and terminal, including all card
authentication methods (SDA, DDA, CDA) and transaction types (on- and oﬄine).
For some of the configuration parameters, the so-called DOLs, minimal assumptions
are hard-coded in the model; these can easily be changed, but analysis of EMVwithout
making assumptions about the DOLs is clearly impossible.
Given the size complexity of the EMV specifications, the formal model is surpris-
ingly small. The model still fits on 5 pages. The use of F# as modelling language
was crucial to keep the formalisation tractable. Our initial attempts to model EMV
in untyped pi-calculus failed, and the use of if-statements and function in F# were a
huge improvement to keep the model comprehensible. Indeed, whereas the F# is 370
lines, the generated ProVerif code by FS2PV is 2527 lines. Admittedly, a handwritten
ProVerif model might be smaller, but this comes at the cost of readability.
Of course, our model abstracts from some of the low-level details that are in
the 700-odd pages EMV specs, e.g. about byte- and bit-level encodings of data. Such
abstraction seems crucial to keep an overview and understand the standard as a whole.
The EMV specs make very little attempt at providing useful levels of abstractions,
apart from use of a standard Tag-Length-Value (TLV) encoding.
We had to come up with the security requirements to verify ourselves, as these are
at best very implicit in the official specifications. We expected this might be hard,
but the rather generic security requirement – that after a transaction all parties agree
on all that transaction’s parameters – captures the essential security requirement in
an intuitive and easy way.
4.2 Learning models of bank cards
In this section we describe our work on the automated reverse engineering of EMV
bank cards using the model inference techniques explained in Section 2.3 [ARP13].
Such automated reverse-engineering, which only observes the smart card as a black
box, takes little effort and is fast. The finite state machine models obtained provide
a useful insight into decisions (or indeed mistakes) made in the design and implemen-
tation, and would be useful as part of security evaluations – not just for bank cards
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but for smart card applications in general – as they can show unexpected additional
functionality that is easily missed in conformance tests.
Software for bank or credit cards will be developed using a very strict and regi-
mented software engineering process. After all, this software is highly security-critical
and patching is usually not an option. The software will be subjected to rigorous
compliance tests and security certifications, possibly even costly Common Criteria
certifications.
Establishing security here is often more difficult than just establishing correctness,
or compliance with a standard. In checking compliance (e.g. for interoperability) the
emphasis tends to be on the presence of required functionality: if some functionality is
missing, the implementation is incorrect and it will not work correctly in all circum-
stances. Security on the other hand is also concerned with the absence of unwanted
functionality; if an implementation provides more functionality than what is required,
then it may be considered compliant – after all, it does what it is supposed to do –
but it might be insecure, as it does more than what it is supposed to do, and this
additional functionality may be a source of insecurity. This makes it hard to test for
security bugs, and to discover them in the field: unlike functional bugs, security bugs
may never show up under normal circumstances.
Testing of security applications using model-based testing techniques seems an
interesting approach to test for security vulnerabilities [FAZB11], as a generalisation
of fuzzing. It does however require formal models that specify the intended behaviour
of the system, and in practice these are often not available, because creating them is
time-consuming, and possibly complex and error-prone. Constructing these models
automatically would therefore be extremely useful. A potential approach is to use
program analysis to construct models from source code. Of course, in many cases,
access to source code is restricted. The method discussed in this section constructs
models just by observing the smart card’s external behaviour.
For our tests on EMV bank cards we used a collection of MasterCard and Visa
branded debit and credit cards from the Netherlands, Germany, Sweden and the
UK. All the MasterCard credit cards contain a MasterCard application, whereas on
the bank cards there is a Maestro application. Both these applications are used
for payments in shops and to withdraw cash from ATMs. The Dutch bank cards
also contain a SecureCode Aut application, which is used for online banking with a
handheld EMV-CAP reader provided by the bank (see Section 5.1). The Visa branded
debit card contains the Visa Debit application.
We used authentic bank cards as SUT/Teacher. Access to the smart cards was
realised via a standard smart card reader and a testing harness, which we discuss
in Section 4.2.1. We connected the SUT to the LearnLib library (see Section 2.3.3)
which served as Learner, see Figure 4.1.
In our experiments we used a random walk method with 1000 test traces of length
10 to 50 as equivalence oracle. We verified our results with the W-method by Chow
[Cho78] to check if it will find at least one more state than the random test suite.
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Figure 4.1: Set-up
4.2.1 Test harness
As illustrated in Figure 4.1, our test harness translates the abstract command (from
the input alphabet of our Mealy machine model) to a concrete Command APDU, and
translates a Response APDU to a more abstract response (in the output alphabet
of the Mealy machine model). The following commands are supported by the test
harness:
• SELECT APPLICATION
• GET PROCESSING OPTIONS
• READ RECORD
• GET DATA
• INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE
• GET CHALLENGE
• VERIFY
• GENERATE AC
The test harness is just over 300 lines of Java code. Most of this code is generic
code to set up a connection to the smart card reader. A regular smart card reader
was used, and communication was performed using the standard Java Smart Card
I/O library. The code specific to EMV is just over 100 lines of code, and consists of
15 methods that define a particular Command APDU to be sent to the card. The
input alphabet corresponds to these 15 methods.
For many parameters of these commands the test harness uses some fixed value,
for instance for the random number sent as argument of the command INTERNAL
AUTHENTICATE, the payload data for the cryptograms generated by the card, and the
(correct) guess for the PIN code. One would not expect a different random number
to affect the control flow of the application in any meaningful way, so by fixing values
here we are unlikely to miss interesting behaviour. Note that we have two different
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payloads when requesting the cryptograms due to the difference between the first and
second request for a cryptogram. As these payloads are different, both a correct and
an incorrect payload is used when requesting cryptograms. Obviously, entering an
incorrect PIN code would affect the control flow, but learning about the behaviour in
response to incorrect PIN guesses is very destructive as it will quickly block the card.
For several commands different variants are provided by the test harness:
• For the commands GET DATA, READ RECORD and GET PROCESSING OPTIONS, both
a variant with correct arguments and one with incorrect arguments is provided.
E.g., for GET DATA we have variants requesting a data element that is present
or one that is not.
• For the GENERATE AC command 6 variants are provided, as there are 3 cryp-
togram types, each of which can be used with one of two sequences of arguments
(one for the first and one for the second cryptogram).
The test harness does not output the entire response of the smart card to the
learner. It only returns the 2 byte status word, but not any additional data returned
by the card. For most commands, like GET PROCESSING OPTIONS, this additional
data returned will always be the same, so there is not much interest in learning it.
The only exception to this is the GENERATE AC command: here the test harness does
return the type of cryptogram that was returned by the card (but not the cryptogram
itself; as this is computed using a cryptographic function on the input and the card’s
ATC, the response will never be the same and there is nothing we could hope to learn
from it).
A limitation of our test harness is that we do not know the bank’s secret cryp-
tographic keys that might be needed to complete one ‘correct’ path of the protocol,
namely the path where the card produces an ARQC as first cryptogram and a TC as
second. For this a correct reply to the first ARQC is needed, which requires knowledge
of the cryptographic keys used by the bank’s back end.
To be able to include the VERIFY command in the learning, the PIN code of the
corresponding card has to be known. We did not try to learn the behaviour of the card
in response to incorrect PIN codes, to avoid blocking the card. The cards we used
are real bank cards for which we cannot reset the PIN. (With access to functionality
to reset the PIN, which the issuing bank might have, one could also try to learn the
behaviour in response to incorrect PINs.) The German card only supported encrypted
PIN verification. Since the public key of MasterCard is needed to be able to encrypt
the PIN and this public key is not published, we were unfortunately not able to use
the VERIFY command with this card.
The Visa branded card can perform the GET DATA command to retrieve the cur-
rent value of the ATC. This functionality is used for a so-called mapper compo-
nent [AJU10,ASV10] to be able to learn the transitions where a counter is increased.
The mapper is integrated in the test harness of the SUT, and keeps track of the value
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of the counter. The GET DATA command only returns the current value of the ATC if
the Visa Debit application is selected. Since the mapper depends on the value of the
ATC, the Visa Debit application is automatically selected by the test harness before
an output query is performed by LearnLib. The mapper retrieves the value of the
ATC after each output query and adds the difference with the stored value of the
ATC to the response, e.g. ‘+1’ on an edge indicates the ATC was increased by one in
this transition.
4.2.2 Trimming the inferred state diagrams
The state diagrams returned by LearnLib as .dot file look quite unintelligible at first
sight, because there are so many transitions: for each state, one for every possible
command. However, many transitions from a given state are errors and simply re-
turn to the same or an error state (e.g. the ‘Selected’ or ‘Finished’ state). By simply
collapsing all these transitions into one transition marked ‘Other’, and drawing mul-
tiple transitions between the same states with different labels as one transition with
a set of labels, we obtain simple automata such as figures 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5. In
these figures the responses are omitted for readability. We simply obtained these by
manually editing the .dot files. This could easily be automated. At the same time we
chose meaningful names for the different states.
The transition labels for GENERATE AC commands indicate (i) if it is the 1st or 2nd
request for a cryptogram in this session (i.e. whether the argument is for the first or
second request), (ii) the type of cryptogram that was requested (ARQC, AAC, or TC),
and (iii) the type of cryptogram that was returned. E.g. GENERATE AC 1st ARQC ARQC
means the type requested was ARQC, with the arguments supplied for the first re-
quest, and the type returned was an ARQC. We have combined arrows if different
parameters yield the same response; e.g. GENERATE AC 2nd TC/AAC AAC means that
requests for a TC or AAC, with the arguments for the second request, both result in
an AAC.
4.2.3 Results
We learned models of EMV applications on bank cards issued by several Dutch banks
(ABN AMRO, ING, Rabobank) and one German bank (Volksbank), on MasterCard
credit cards issued by Dutch and Swedish banks (SEB, ABN AMRO, ING) and on
one Visa debit card from the United Kingdom (Barclays). The Dutch bank cards
contain two EMV applications, one for internet banking (SecureCode Aut) and one
for ATMs and Point-of-Sales (Maestro). All cards resulted in different models, with as
only exception that the Maestro applications on all Dutch bank cards were identical,
as were the SecureCode Aut applications. An educated guess would be that these
implementations come from the same vendor.
To learn the models LearnLib performed between 855 and 1695 membership
queries for each card and produced models with 4 to 8 states. The total learning
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Initialisation Other
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SELECT
Other
GPO performed
GET PROCESSING OPTIONS (valid)Other
GET DATA (valid) / VERIFY /
READ RECORD (valid)
Transaction finished
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AAC
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INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE
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ARQC
Other
GENERATE AC 1st AAC
AAC
GET DATA (valid) / VERIFY /
READ RECORD (valid)
GENERATE AC 1st TC / ARQC
ARQC
Other
GENERATE AC 2nd TC / AAC
AAC
Figure 4.2: Automaton of Dutch Maestro application. Just to highlight one observa-
tion that can be made from this diagram: the VERIFY instruction, i.e. the verification
of the PIN code by the smart card, is optional; this makes sense because the terminal
may check the PIN code with the bank (so-called online PIN verification), or choose
not to verify the PIN at all.
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GET PROCESSING OPTIONS (valid)Other
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GET DATA (valid) / READ RECORD (valid) / VERIFY
GENERATE AC 1st AAC
AAC
GENERATE AC 1st TC
TC
ARQC requested
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Figure 4.3: Automaton of Dutch SecureCode Aut application. Note that here the
VERIFY operation – i.e. verification of the PIN code – must be passed successfully
before cryptograms can be generated, except for the AAC cryptogram to abort the
session.
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Figure 4.4: Automaton of Maestro application on a German Volksbank bank card.
Note that it is very different from the Dutch Maestro card in Figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.5: Automaton of Visa Debit application on Barclays card. Note that the
INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE can be performed at any stage of the protocol.
4.2. Learning models of bank cards 43
time depended on the algorithm and corresponding parameters used for equivalence
approximation. The time needed to construct the final hypothesis was less than 20
minutes for every card. Using the random walk method, it took between 9 and 35
minutes to generate a model. With the W-method by Chow it varied from 20 to 65
minutes. However, both algorithms led to the same models.
When analysing the state diagrams for the different categories, we made the fol-
lowing observations.
The state diagrams for the ABN AMRO and ING credit cards are very similar.
There are only a few subtle differences, e.g in the initial state different error codes
are returned in response to some instructions. Also the handling of the INTERNAL
AUTHENTICATE instruction differs: both cards respond with the error 6D00 (‘Instruc-
tion code not supported or invalid’), indicating that the instruction is not supported,
but for the ING card this does not have any influence on the state, whereas the ABN
AMRO card is ‘reset’ to the ‘Selected’ state.
Comparing the Maestro (Figure 4.2) and the SecureCode Aut application (Fig-
ure 4.3) on the Dutch bank cards, we can observe the following:
1. In both applications, if data that is not available is requested, either using the
READ RECORD or the GET DATA instruction, the application returns to the ‘Se-
lected’ state. This seems a bit strict, as the terminal has no way of knowing
whether certain data that can be retrieved using GET DATA is available. Appar-
ently, here the developers have chosen a ‘safe by default’ approach. Though this
seems a sensible approach, one can imagine this can lead to compatibility prob-
lems with terminals that expect certain data to be present on the card while it
is not, as the card will reset to a state that the terminal might not expect.
2. With the SecureCode Aut application it is possible, after successfully verifying
the PIN code, to request a TC cryptogram using the GENERATE AC instruction.
This is surprising, as this does not have any meaning in EMV-CAP: in an EMV-
CAP session the terminal must always first ask for an ARQC. One would expect
that requesting a TC cryptogram type would result in an error (as e.g. happens
when a second ARQC is requested) or in an AAC being returned to abort the
session (as e.g. happens when any type of cryptogram is requested before PIN
verification). Still, it does not seem that this spurious TC cryptogram can
be exploited to cause a security vulnerability, at least insofar as we know the
EMV-CAP protocol, which is discussed in Section 5.1.
3. The error code that is given in response to the INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE in-
struction is different depending on the state in the SecureCode Aut application.
In those states where it is possible in the Maestro application to perform this ac-
tion, the error code is 6987 (‘Expected secure messaging data objects missing’),
while in the other states, an error code 6985 (‘Usage conditions not satisfied’)
is returned.
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Compared to the cards considered before, the Volksbank card handles things a bit
differently (see Figure 4.4):
1. Where the other cards return to the ‘Selected’ state when an error occurs,
the Volksbank card goes into a ‘Finished’ state. From a ‘Finished’ state there
is one transition using the SELECT APPLICATION command to get to the ‘Se-
lected’ again, and one to get to the ‘GPO performed’ state using a valid GET
PROCESSING OPTIONS command.
2. Data authentication using DDA is also handled differently with this card. First,
the card forces DDA to be performed, i.e. if no INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE com-
mand is given, transactions cannot be performed: the GENERATE AC command
will then always return an error. Also, it is possible to perform DDA even if the
card is in a ‘Finished’ state. This suggests that the INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE
command is handled separately from the other commands and keeps its own
state to indicate whether it is already performed. Below we compare this with
what the MasterCard’s specifications say.
3. If in the first GENERATE AC a TC is requested, the card indicates it wants to
go online by returning an ARQC. However, after an ARQC is returned the
first time, when requesting a TC in the second GENERATE AC, this is actually
returned. This seems odd since one would expect this request to fail (i.e. an
AAC to be returned), as we did not provide a valid response from the bank.
An interesting observation considering all cards is that the state diagrams can
be used as fingerprints for the cards. Since the state diagrams are different for each
type of card, and indeed each type of application on them, it is possible to determine
a sequence of commands that gives a different result for each of the categories. As
a matter of fact, just looking at the response to the GET DATA and READ RECORD
instructions in the initial state one can already determine which application one is
dealing with. However, using these fingerprints to identify cards is not so interesting
for an attacker, as the cards already reveal plenty of uniquely identifying information.
For some smart card applications, such as electronic passports, such fingerprints are
unwanted though [RMP08].
Difference with MasterCard’s specifications
The Maestro and MasterCard-branded applications should all conform to Master-
Card’s Paypass-M/Chip specification2. This specification specifies a state diagram,
which has only 5 states, whereas the models we obtained for Maestro cards have 6 or
7 states.
2This specification is for dual interface (contact and contactless) cards, rather than contact-only
cards, but states that the state diagram for contact-only cards is the same, except that it has one
transition less [Mas05, p. 98].
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In the state diagram specified by MasterCard the operation INTERNAL
AUTHENTICATE has no effect on the state, meaning that this operation – i.e. perform-
ing DDA – is optional and can be done any number of times. In contrast, the model
learned for the Dutch Maestro card says that this operation can be done at most once
before cryptograms can be generated, and the model for the Volksbank Maestro card
says that it must be done exactly once before cryptograms can be generated.
Another difference between the state diagram of the Volksbank card and the one
specified by MasterCard is the presence of the ‘Finished (no DDA)’ state, which seems
to be a spurious dead-end in the behaviour of the Volksbank card, as it does not lead
to a normal protocol run which ends where one or two cryptograms are generated.
As these cards carry the Maestro or MasterCard logo, they must have undergone
some certification. Assuming that their certification has not missed potential com-
patibility problems caused by these deviations from MasterCard’s specification, this
suggests that this process does not include checking for implementation of the exact
state machine.
Different choices in the Visa branded card
In the models of the MasterCard applications there exists an ‘Initialisation’ state from
which the applications can be selected on the smart card. Since with the Visa branded
card the test harness automatically selects the Visa Debit application, this initialisation
state is not included in the learned models and the initial state is ‘Selected’.
The Visa branded card is quite different from the others. For example, with
the Visa card the commands GET DATA, READ RECORD and VERIFY are allowed in all
states, even before the transaction is initialised with GET PROCESSING OPTIONS and
after the actual transaction is started with a GENERATE AC command or even finished.
These commands are thus apparently completely independent from the state of the
card. Also, DDA can be performed, by an INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE, completely
independent of any other actions, again even during and after a transaction.
In the model it can be seen from the additional information added by the mapper
that only two transitions increase the ATC. This indicates that the ATC is increased
when performing a successful GET PROCESSING OPTIONS command (i.e. 9000 is re-
turned as the status word).
4.2.4 Conclusions
We have demonstrated that after defining a simple test harness/mapper component,
we can easily obtain useful state machine models for banking smart cards using learn-
ing and simple abstraction techniques [RSBM09,AJU10]. After some trimming, the
models obtained are easy to understand for anyone familiar with the EMV standard,
and clearly highlight some of the central decisions taken in an implementation.
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Differences in the models obtained for different cards may be inconsequential dif-
ferences that exploit the implementation freedom allowed by the under-specification
in the EMV specifications, but can really affect the security conditions imposed (for
example, the difference between figures 4.2 and 4.3 in requiring PIN code verification).
To determine which is which, we have relied on ad-hoc manual work and human in-
telligence - the models obtained are easy to inspect visually. This step could even be
automated if security conditions are expressed as temporal logic formulae.
Although we get these formal models for free – i.e. without very little effort –, it
does still require a human expert to see if the models obtained are correct and secure.
Differences in the state diagrams do not necessarily mean that implementations
are not secure or that they cannot be regarded as compliant to the standard. The
diagrams are a helpful aid in deciding whether this is the case. However, this decision
then inevitably relies on an informal understanding of the standard and the essential
security requirements. One would like to see more objective criteria for this, especially
as security protocols are notoriously brittle and deciding what constitutes a secure
refinement of the specification is not always easy.
The complexity of the standards involved makes such models very valuable. In
fact, finite state machine models such as we obtain would be a useful addition to the
official specifications. Despite the length of the EMV specifications [EMV08], state
diagrams describing the smart card are conspicuously absent. A state diagram is
specified in MasterCard’s specification [Mas05], but most of the cards we analysed
actually did not conform to it. The differences between e.g. figures 4.2 and 4.4 show
the considerable leeway there is between different implementations of the same spec.
One would expect (and hope?) that engineers developing, testing, or certifying EMV
smart cards do have such state diagrams, either in the official documentation or just
scribbled on a whiteboard.
The models learnt did not reveal any security issues. Indeed, one would not ex-
pect to find any in smart cards such as we considered, which should have undergone
rigorous security evaluations and tests. Still, we do notice some peculiarities (no-
tably that the Volksbank card is still willing to return a TC even after failed issuer
authentication). We believe that our approach would be useful as part of security
evaluations, because it increases the rigour and confidence provided and it can save
a lot of expensive and boring manual labour.
Here it helps that LearnLib learns the behaviour blindly, in a completely haphaz-
ard way, without any of the preconceptions or expectations about what the ‘normal’
behaviour is that a human tester or code reviewer might have. The tool learns about
all the possible behaviour. This is an advantage for security, as security bugs often
occur under unusual conditions, when someone does something unexpected.
Still, the hand-coded test harness we developed does make some assumptions
about the functionality that the card provides. The test harness implements the basic
operations for EMV, and LearnLib then only learns all the possible behaviours given
these operations. A deliberately introduced backdoor would thus not be detected,
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but we conjecture that any mistake in the implementation of the internal state and
the associated control flow in the smart card code would.

Chapter 5
Securing online transactions
For internet banking, many banks let their clients use a handheld smartcard reader
with a small display and keypad. In combination with a smartcard and PIN code,
this reader then signs challenges provided on the bank’s web page, to log in or to
confirm bank transfers. Many of these systems use a proprietary standard of Mas-
terCard on top of the EMV standard, called the Chip Authentication Program, also
known as EMV-CAP. In this chapter, first EMV-CAP is discussed in more detail.
We then introduce the concept of What-You-See-Is-What-You-Sign (WYSIWYS) and
analyse a device used for online banking that makes use of this security property, the
e.dentifier2. Both a manual and an automated analysis of this device were performed.
Finally, we will present a solution to secure online transactions that provides stronger
security guarantees than most existing solutions.
5.1 EMV-CAP
Though the EMV-CAP standard is confidential and only available under a non-
disclosure agreement, it has been largely reverse engineered [DMA09, ST11] and an
informative description is leaked (apparently accidentally) in [Che, Appendix 1]. To
use EMV-CAP, an additional application is included on the bank card next to the
regular EMV application.
For an EMV-CAP session, a full EMV transaction is performed by first requesting
an ARQC followed by a request for an AAC. A session starts by requesting the
PIN from the user. The user is optionally presented with a challenge and/or other
transaction-related data by the bank. After the PIN verification, this data is either
entered on the handheld reader by the user or transferred to it using, for example,
a USB connection. The ARQC is used in combination with the ATC to generate a
response for the bank, while the AAC is only used to leave the card in a clean state by
correctly finishing the transaction. The response is typically computed by applying
the Issuer Proprietary Bitmap (IPB) on the concatenation of the PAN Sequence
Number (PSN), ATC, ARQC and IAD, thus selecting only part of the bits from
these values. The PSN is optionally included in the bitfilter and whether it should
be included is indicated in the Issuer Authentication Flag on the card. The result of
this bitfilter is then converted to digits, making it easier for the user to enter them
again on the bank’s website. Several variations exist within the standard, defining
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User Handheld reader Bank card
ask for PIN
PIN
VERIFY (PIN)
PIN OK
ask for challenge
Challenge
GENERATE AC (ARQC, Challenge)
ARQC, ATC
GENERATE AC (AAC, Challenge)
AAC, ATC
(PSN ‖ ATC ‖ ARQC ‖ IAD) && IPB
Figure 5.1: A typical EMV-CAP session using Mode 1 without amount or currency
code
what data is sent to the card in the GENERATE AC commands and how the response
is computed.
InMode 1 the bank always provides a challenge to the user. This challenge is then
sent to the card with the GENERATE AC command in the field for the Unpredictable
Number, as specified in the corresponding CDOL. Next to this, the amount and
currency code can also be included in the command. If a value is not included it is
replaced with a constant value of all zeroes. The response is computed by applying
the bitfilter as discussed before. A typical example of Mode 1 without amount or
currency code can be seen in Figure 5.1. This variant, where no amount or currency
code is set, is also referred to as Mode 3 .
Mode 2 is identical to Mode 1, except that no challenge or additional data is
included in the GENERATE AC commands at all. The response value is therefore only
dependent on the ATC, which makes it possible to harvest these responses in advance
from a card. This would only be detected by the bank if an authorisation using
a higher ATC already took place before the harvested responses are used. As an
extension to this mode Mode 2 with Transaction Data Signing (TDS) was introduced.
In this mode, additional data from the bank is used in the authorisation. The different
data fields from the bank are concatenated and used as input to a MAC using DES.
The key that is used for this MAC is the ARQC, and the resulting MAC is used
instead of the ARQC when applying the bitfilter. As with the regular Mode 2, no
transaction related data is sent to the card. So again, data can be harvested in advance
and be used to compute the correct response when the bank presents the challenge
and additional data to be signed. By using this last mode any guarantee that the
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card was present is lost, which you can get by using a smart card for security-critical
computations in calculating the response to a challenge.
Usually, the PIN code used for the EMV-CAP application on a bank card is
identical to the one used for the regular EMV transaction. This is convenient for
the user, as he only needs to remember one PIN code but introduces a security risk
as well [DMA09]. For example, when using a rogue POS terminal to pay for your
groceries, this terminal could at the same time contact your bank and set up an online
transfer. Having access to all necessary data to complete an EMV-CAP successfully –
including the necessary PIN code – it can compute the correct response to authorise
the transaction. A typical measure banks take to prevent this kind of attack is by
asking the user for additional data that is not present on the chip of the bank card
when authorising an action, for example when logging in to the bank’s website. This
additional data could, for example, be a username/password combination or a card
number.
Another risk is type confusion for the values provided by the bank [DMA09]. An
example of this is when Mode 1 with the transaction amount included is used for
both log in and signing transactions. When logging in, the transaction amount is set
to 0. As a result of this, logging in and transferring 0 euro will result in an identical
response code. An attacker could therefore try using social engineering to convince a
user to perform a transaction of 0 euro and reveal the response code, thus enabling
the attacker to log in on the user’s account using this response code.
The main limitation of EMV-CAP is that the user, in general, does not know what
he is exactly signing. With Mode 1, when the user is provided with a challenge and
amount of the transaction, the destination account of the transaction is not included
in the authorisation. The user can therefore never be sure where he is sending the
money to. This is even worse when the amount is not included in the authorisation, as
he cannot even be sure if he is not transferring all his money to the attacker. When
using Mode 2 with TDS, additional data might be included in the authorisation.
However, the meaning of these data fields is not standardised and it depends on
the implementation of the handheld reader how clear their meaning is to the user.
For example, with the Random Reader of the Rabobank there is no functionality to
indicate the meaning of the data fields. The only way to indicate the meaning is
therefore through the website, which might be under control of the attacker in, for
example, a Man-in-the-Browser attack.
5.2 What-You-See-Is-What-You-Sign
A two-factor authentication as EMV-CAP, which requires access to a smart card and
a PIN code, is of course much stronger than a traditional password. Still, a serious
and fundamental limitation of these handheld readers is that the challenges have to
be quite short, usually 8 digits, for the user to be able to easily enter them on the
reader. Therefore they do not offer much scope for a message that is meaningful to
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the user. As the challenge is often just random the user has no real idea what he
is authorising. This means that a Man-in-the-Browser attack, where the attackers
controls the browser on the client’s PC, can still let someone unwittingly approve
unwanted transactions.
This risk can be mitigated by letting the user sign additional challenges, for in-
stance the amount or say the last eight digits of the bank account, which are meaning-
ful to the user. Some online banking sites use such additional challenges for transfers
with high amounts or transfers to bank accounts not used before by a customer. The
downside of this is more hassle for the user, typing the extra challenges and responses.
Also, a compromised browser could still trick users into signing these additional chal-
lenges, as a user cannot tell if an apparently random challenge is not in fact an amount
or the last 8 digits of the attacker’s bank account. Users could be asked to type in
more than eight digits, possibly using devices with a bigger display, but clearly there
will be a limit on how much hassle users are willing to accept.
Connecting the reader to the PC with, for example, a USB cable can solve the
problem, or at least drastically reduce the risk and impact of Man-in-the-Browser
attacks. The user no longer has to retype challenges and responses, making longer
challenges acceptable. Moreover, the display can be alphanumeric (even if the key-
board is numeric only), allowing more meaningful challenges for the user. Not only
security is improved, but also user-friendliness, as users do not have to retype chal-
lenges and responses.
Having such a setup, it is possible to implement so-called WYSIWYS functionality.
This means the information that is shown on the screen is actually included in the
signature generated to authenticate the action and this signature is only computed
after explicit approval by the user. If the challenge displayed includes, for example,
the destination account and the amount, this provides protection against Man-in-the-
Browser (MitB) attacks as the user knows what will be signed and has to approve
this. Depending on the actual displayed messages, WYSIWYS therefore can provide
very strong security guarantees for both the user and the bank.
5.3 e.dentifier2
The e.dentifier2 is a handheld reader to secure online banking transactions originally
developed by Todos AB, which is now owned by Gemalto. It provides a screen and
numeric keyboard, and it can be used with or without a USB connection. If used with
the USB connection, the device provides WYSIWYS functionality – called Sign-What-
You-See (SWYS) by Gemalto. As this sounded promising and we were interested in
possible other uses, the device was largely reverse engineered by Arjan Blom [Blo11].
On the website of the manufacturer the device was promised to be “the most secure
“sign-what-you-see” end-user device ever seen”, though this was certainly not the
case in the first version as shown in [Blo11, BKGP+12]. An attacker that controls
the user’s PC is able to let the user sign a transaction without explicit approval, i.e
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WYSIWYS would be broken. As the source code of the device is not available, it
was necessary to reverse engineer the device to discover how it operates. This was
done by looking at the browser plugin that is used to communicate with the device,
the USB traffic between the PC and the device, and the smart card communication
between the device and the bank card.
5.3.1 Unconnected mode
Without USB connection, the device behaves like a standard EMV-CAP reader. The
device offers 5 different modes in its menu:
• Log on, in this mode no challenge is entered by the user. The user is asked for
a PIN, and is presented a response code to login to the bank’s website. Mode 2
of EMV-CAP is used for, so no challenge is sent to the card.
• Send transact., this mode is used to confirm a transaction. The user can enter
a challenge of up to 8 digits. This mode does not quite follow the known EMV-
CAP modes, as the data sent and received from the card is first mangled using
some hashing and/or encryption. A challenge is sent to the card in the GENERATE
AC command, as with Mode 3 of EMV-CAP. This challenge is not the same as
the one entered by the user but it is dependent on this value. Also, the ARQC is
not used directly in the application of the bitfilter. Instead it is used to mangle
some data, which includes at least the challenge entered by the user. Changing
the least significant bits of the ARQC does not change the response code, which
is a strong indication it is used as a key in some DES operation as these bits are
used as parity bits in DES and not used in the actual cryptographic operations.
• Check acc. nr., this mode seems to be identical the previous mode. The man-
gling of the data sent to the card and received from it seems to be different,
indicating the mode is somehow included in the mangling of the data.
• Check input, again this mode seems to be identical to the two previous modes
except for the data mangling.
• SecureCode, this mode provides EMV-CAP Mode 1, including the amount, cur-
rency and challenge. As opposed to the other modes of the e.dentifier2, the user
is first asked to enter the transaction details and challenge before entering the
PIN code. The user has four options for the currency: Euros, Dollars, Pounds
and other (which results in a currency code of 999). Here, the challenge is sent
to the card without any additional mangling and the bitfilter is applied directly
on the ARQC.
The additional mangling in some of the modes means that there are unknown func-
tions hard-coded in the device. The secrecy of these functions is not crucial for the
security, but it does prevent interoperability with EMV-CAP readers issued by other
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banks, and it prevents the construction of a software emulation of the device, as is
available for other EMV-CAP readers1.
5.3.2 Connected mode
More interesting functionality is provided when the device is connected to a PC using
a USB connection. To use this connected mode, customers have to install a special
driver (only available for Windows and MacOS). The browser then interacts with this
driver via JavaScript and a browser plugin. The browser plugin checks whether it
is connected to either the domain abnamro.nl or abnamro.com using TLS. If this is
not the case, the plugin will not function. The Firefox plugin also allows local files to
use the plugin. This might introduce security risks as, for example, this means that
attachments in emails could also use the plugin.
In connected mode, an internet banking session starts with the reader reading the
bank account number and the card number from the smart card and supplying it to
the browser. This way the user does not have to type this in, making the system more
user-friendly.
To log in, the reader first prompts the user for his PIN code. It then displays a
message saying that the user is about to log in and asks the user to confirm this by
pressing OK.
To confirm a bank transfer, or a set of bank transfers, the reader will again prompt
the user for his PIN code. It then displays a message giving the number of transfers
the user is about to approve and the total amount of the transactions combined, and
asks the user to approve this by pressing OK.
The additional security of the connected mode over the unconnected mode here is
that you see what you sign, even if the browser or the PC it runs on is controlled by
malware. Connecting the e.dentifier2 to a possibly infected PC by USB does introduce
a new attack vector: malicious code on the PC could try to interfere with the device.
Still, given that the device is so simple and offers so little functionality, it should be
possible to design and implement it so that it is secure against such attacks.
The device can display some predefined messages, such as “Transactions sent
successfully.” or “Please follow the instruction on your computer.”. This last message
would of course be ideal for a phishing attack. Users might be easier to convince to
enter sensitive information on a fake page if their e.dentifier2 displays such a message.
5.3.3 The SWYS protocol
The reverse engineering of online banking with the e.dentifier2 in connected mode was
done by eavesdropping on the USB and smart card communication, and replaying
of modified traffic to determine dependencies between data elements [Blo11]. This
1Available from http://sites.uclouvain.be/EMV-CAP
5.3. e.dentifier2 55
Host PC USB reader Smart card
ASK-PIN
display shows ”ENTER PIN”
user enters PIN
VERIFY pin guess
PIN OK
SIGNDATA-TEXT text
SIGNDATA-NUMBER number
display shows text
user presses OK
user pressed OK
GENERATE-AC
GENERATE AC f(text, number)
ARQC
GENERATE AC f(text, number)
AAC
g(ARQC, text, number)
Figure 5.2: SWYS protocol for log-in and for transactions
process revealed the protocol, as it is used by ABN AMRO, shown in Figure 5.2. This
figure outlines the abstract SWYS protocol for logging in or confirming a transaction.
In either case the web browser sends so-called signdata to the reader. This signdata
consists of two parts, namely some text (that is shown on the display) and some
number (which is not):
• In the case of a login, the signdata text specifies the account number and bank
card number; in case of a transaction, it specifies the number of transactions
and the total amount.
• In the case of a login, the signdata number consists of two values: a 4 byte value
giving the current UNIX time and a seemingly random 8 byte value; in case of
a transaction, it is a 20 byte apparently random value.
In the protocol, the reader asks the smart card to produce two cryptograms,
using the GENERATE AC command. Included in these commands is the Unpredictable
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Number. As is usual in EMV-CAP transactions, the first cryptogram is an ARQC,
the second an AAC.
By replaying earlier transactions, and varying the text and number parts of the
signdata, we could confirm that the UN does depend on both the text and the number.
Hence this payload is written as f(text, number) in Figure 5.2. It has to depend on
the text to make sure that ‘we sign what we see’; including the number is useful to
diversify the input and prevent replays, though the computation of the cryptograms
will also involve the card’s transaction counter. We do not know what the function f
is.
To finish a transaction, the reader sends a response back to the web browser, which
is based on the cryptograms generated by the smart card and the complete signdata.
Again, we do not precisely know how this response is computed. However, as with
the unconnected mode it seems that the ARQC reported by the smart card is used
as the key in a Data Encryption Standard (DES) operation. Hence it is written as
g(ARQC, text, number) in Figure 5.2.
Analysis of the browser plugin and corresponding JavaScript libraries revealed the
device also supports Mode 1 and 2 of EMV-CAP via the USB connection. As there is
no challenge or additional data in Mode 2, the user is not asked to confirm the action
but only to enter his PIN. With Mode 1, the user is asked to confirm the amount and
currency of the transaction. As opposed to the protocol as depicted in Figure 5.2, the
user is asked to first confirm the transaction details and only after this to enter his
PIN code. For both EMV-CAP modes, the responses that are returned to the PC are
identical to the ones that would be displayed on the device when used in unconnected
mode.
5.3.4 The attack
As can be seen in Figure 5.2, the reader sends a message to the host PC indicating the
user pressed OK. After this the host PC sends a command to generate the cryptograms
to the reader. This seems strange, as the reader would be expected to generate the
cryptograms automatically after OK has been pressed. The driver on the host PC
should not play a role in this.
This weakness can be exploited: by sending the request over the USB line to
generate the cryptograms without waiting for the user to press OK, the cryptograms
are generated and the reader returns the response over the USB line, without the
user getting a chance to approve or cancel the transaction. To make matters worse,
a side-effect of giving this command is that the display is cleared, so the transaction
details only appear on the display for less than a second. We demonstrated this attack
in an actual internet banking session.
This means that an attacker controlling an infected PC can let the card sign
messages that the user did not approve, thus defeating one of the key objectives of
WYSIWYS. The user still has to enter his PIN, but this is entered at the start
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Host PC USB reader Smart card
ASK-PIN
display shows ”ENTER PIN”
user enters PIN
VERIFY pin guess
PIN OK
SIGNDATA-TEXT text
SIGNDATA-NUMBER number
display shows text
GENERATE-AC
GENERATE AC f(text, number)
ARQC
GENERATE AC f(text, number)
AAC
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Figure 5.3: Attack on SWYS protocol; the difference with Figure 5.2 is that the
driver directly gives the instruction to generate the cryptograms, without waiting for
the user to press OK
of a transaction before any transaction details are shown, and after this no more
interaction is needed from the user to sign malicious transactions.
5.3.5 Extended length challenges
Initially it was mind-boggling to us how this vulnerability could ever have been intro-
duced. Subsequently it became clear that the vulnerability may have been introduced
as a side-effect of having additional functionality in the device, where the device shows
several messages for the user to approve. Presumably this functionality is included
for more complex transactions where more than 68 characters are needed to display
transaction data.
We never observed such transactions in our use of the online banking system, but
using our own software we could see that the device is capable of doing this. Several
messages can be sent to the reader in turn, with the next message being sent after the
user presses OK, and then after the final message the driver can give the command to
generate the response. We could observe that the 4 byte payload sent as challenge to
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the smart card depended on all the texts that were sent to the reader and displayed
there. Presumably the unknown function f implemented in the device hashes these
texts together to compute this challenge.
For this variant of the protocol the reader needs to communicate with the driver
after the user presses OK, namely to request the next part of the message. This
might explain why the weakness has been introduced in the first place, and why it
was missed in security reviews.
Note that this variant of the protocol results in an overloaded semantics for the OK
button: it can mean an instruction (to the driver) to ‘send more data to the display’
or an instruction (to the smart card) to ‘go ahead and generate a cryptogram’. Since
the reader is not aware of the meaning of the button, the host PC has to determine
this, providing a possible origin of the vulnerability.
5.3.6 Preventing the vulnerability
The attack that we found is something that should and could have been detected.
After all, the attack does not involve some detailed cryptanalysis and does not rely
on a cleverly crafted MitM attack or exploit some subtle low level coding mistake.
A patent application describing an e.dentifier2-like solution has been filed by the
company that produces it [Gul10]; the higher level description of the protocol given
there does not include the vulnerability that we found.
We have no insight in the procedures followed in design, implementation, or test-
ing, or indeed any of the associated documentation, so we can only speculate how
the vulnerability could possibly have been missed. Still, we can consider how it could
have been spotted, or, better still, prevented in the first place.
Firstly, the attack breaks one of the central security objectives of WYSIWYS.
This security objective should be used as a basis for considering abuse cases. An
obvious abuse case that could already have been identified in the early design phase
is: malicious code on the PC that tries to get the reader to sign without the user’s
approval. It seems unlikely that the vulnerability could have gone unnoticed in design,
implementation and testing if this abuse case was made explicit, as it would then have
been considered by e.g. a reviewer of the specifications or tester of the implementation.
In fact, one would then expect someone developing the specification or implementing
it to notice the problem long before any post-hoc security evaluation.
As discussed in Section 5.3.5, it seems that the semantics of pressing the OK
button is overloaded. This overloading could be spotted in a high-level specification
that only considers the interaction with the user, if in such a specification one tries
to make the semantics of pressing OK explicit.
Finally, even if the problem went unnoticed in the design, the problem could
still have been detected by more systematic testing. Exhaustive testing is of course
impossible, even for a system as simple as this: the messages over the USB line are
small but too long for exhaustively testing all possible contents. Still, the number of
5.4. Analysing the e.dentifier2 using Lego 59
Figure 5.4: Our Lego robot is capable of pressing three buttons on the e.dentifier2.
The learning setup includes the Lego robot, circuitry to power the engines, and a
Raspberry Pi that interacts with the e.dentifier2 and controls the engines.
different types of messages over the USB line is very small. The number of internal
states of the reader, which correspond to particular states of the simple protocol it
implements, is very small too. This makes it a feasible option to apply automated
learning techniques as will be shown in the next section.
5.4 Analysing the e.dentifier2 using Lego
In this section we describe our analysis of a handheld smart card reader for online
banking – the e.dentifier2 that was introduced in Section 5.3 – using automated
learning techniques. This section is based on [CPPR14]. The original robot was built
by Georg Chalupar and Stefan Peherstorfer. The goal of this research was to see if we
could automate the analysis described in Section 5.3. At the moment of this research
a new version of the e.dentifier2 was released where the problem that we discovered
was fixed. This gave us two different devices to test our approach on.
To prevent people from opening and changing or analysing handheld readers, these
often contain tamper-proof features that prevent the reader from functioning after it
has been opened. To avoid breaking the device by opening it, a robot was constructed
using Lego and controlled by a Raspberry Pi to press the buttons. Controlling all this
from a laptop, we then can use LearnLib to learn the behaviour of handheld readers.
5.4.1 Lego robot
To press the buttons on the e.dentifier2 we found a cheap and flexible solution by
using Lego motors (see Figure 5.4). A small gear on the motors is used to move a
Lego bar via a toothed rack.
In our experiments, we used a smart card that we programmed ourselves to provide
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the required EMV support. An advantage of this was that we could fix some of the
behaviour of the card, and make it produce fixed responses for each EMV command.
For a real bank card the ATC is included in the Application Cryptogram and increased
after each request, and therefore the responses to the GENERATE AC will be different
each time. The resulting change in the output would have to be filtered out to learn
the state machine with LearnLib.
The robot needs to be able to enter PIN codes and press the OK and Cancel
buttons. As we used our own smart card, we let it accept all PIN codes so that only
one ‘finger’ is needed to enter the same digit four times. In total only three fingers
were needed and three Lego motors to move them up and down.
We choose a Raspberry Pi to actuate the motors as it offers General-purpose
Input/Output (GPIO) pins which are easy to program and, like the Lego motors, it
is also powered by 5 Volt. Additionally, the Raspberry Pi contains a USB port, which
is used to communicate with the e.dentifier2, and an Ethernet port, which is used to
control the Raspberry Pi from the PC running LearnLib.
When setting the timing for moving the fingers up and down, there is the risk
that on long test runs, taking several hours and thousands of key presses, errors in
the timing would accumulate and cause the fingers not to press down enough. We
therefore set the time for moving the finger down a small fraction too long, so that
we are certain that the buttons are always pressed down completely.
5.4.2 Software
Our test harness for the e.dentifier2 is written in Python and runs on the Raspberry
Pi. This script controls the motors and resets the device. Additionally, it sends the
USB commands to the e.dentifier2 using the PyUSB library. LearnLib runs on a
separate laptop and the queries are sent to the test harness via a TCP socket. The
input alphabet for LearnLib consists of command names that represent either USB
messages or commands for the Lego robot. For the equivalence checking, we used
either the random walk method or the W-method.
Especially in longer experiments, we experienced problems with non-deterministic
behaviour due to, for example, buttons not always correctly being pressed. At one
point we got a lot of non-deterministic behaviour, which LearnLib cannot handle
and results in an endless loop. After some debugging it turned at that the numeric
button used for the PIN code got stuck once in a while because it was worn down too
much by all the button presses. After changing to another digit, the robot functioned
again. To counter this kind of problems, we made use of an alternative version of the
software using majority voting where all queries are executed twice. If the results are
different, the query is executed a third time and this output is given if it is equal to
one of the first two outputs. If all three outputs are different, the software will throw
an exception.
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5.4.3 Experiments
Input and output symbols
The input symbols are based on the USB commands discovered by the previous reverse
engineering discussed in Section 5.3. A normal transaction starts with the SHIELD
command, after which the e.dentifier2 displays the logo of the bank (a “shield”) three
times. Next, INSERT CARD sets the language (in our case “EN” for English) and
waits until the bank card is inserted. The PIN command causes the device to ask
for the PIN and send it to the card. After that, SIGNDATA sends binary data to be
included in the cryptogram. The DISPLAY TEXT command encodes a text to be
included in the cryptogram, that is shown on the screen and has to be confirmed by
the user with the OK button. Finally, GEN CRYPTOGRAM tells the e.dentifier2 to
get a cryptogram from the smart card.
In addition to these USB commands, the input symbols ROBOT OK and
ROBOT CANCEL instruct the robot to press the OK or Cancel button respectively.
To accelerate the learning process by keeping the number input symbols and states
low, we defined some input symbols that combine two or more inputs.
• COMBINED INIT consists of SHIELD followed by INSERT CARD;
• COMBINED DATA combines SIGNDATA and DISPLAY TEXT;
• COMBINED PIN translates to the PIN USB command plus the robot pressing
four times a digit followed by the OK button.
Moreover, we added the option to automatically issue the COMBINED INIT com-
mand after every reset of the e.dentifier2.
The USB responses of the e.dentifier2 are used as output symbols for the learn-
ing process. The smart card communication and messages on the screen were not
observed.
After a robot action or sending a USB command, the Raspberry Pi waits 1 second
for a response via USB. We assumed that USB messages are sent in chunks of 8 bytes,
as the previous reverse engineering indicated. Although the USB responses seem to
encode whether more chunks will be sent, our script attempts to read data via USB
until no more data is received for 1 second. While our smart card is programmed to
always send the same cryptogram, the USB responses to the GEN CRYPTOGRAM
command can vary because the e.dentifier2 manipulates the cryptogram based on
the data supplied by SIGNDATA and DISPLAY TEXT. Therefore, we classify ev-
ery message starting with a particular prefix as a cryptogram. Optionally, we dis-
tinguish an EMPTY CRYPTOGRAM, which is the response when neither SIGN-
DATA nor DISPLAY TEXT has been sent before the cryptogram is requested, and a
VALID CRYPTOGRAM, which is the response after sending the original commands
as used in a valid transaction (i.e. one SIGNDATA and one DISPLAY TEXT).
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Learning parameter and timings
At the beginning of every input sequence, the e.dentifier2 has to be reset to an initial
state. As we want to be sure all previous operation have finished and it is ready
to accept commands after this, we included some waiting times. On average a reset
command therefore takes 5.6 seconds. Pressing a single button takes 2.5 seconds
on average, including waiting for the device to get ready to accept a button press
and waiting for a possible response. Combining multiple key presses when entering
a PIN code takes on average 4.4 seconds. A command that only requires a single
USB message takes 1.1 seconds on average, mainly due to the waiting for a possible
response.
We first learned models using coarser-grained combined actions, and then we
learned more detailed models using more fine-grained actions:
• First, we learned a coarse-grained model where COMBINED INIT is per-
formed after every reset and with a reduced input alphabet consisting of COM-
BINED DATA, COMBINED PIN, ROBOT OK, and GEN CRYPTOGRAM.
Moreover, we did not distinguish between the EMPTY CRYPTOGRAM and
other CRYPTOGRAM responses in this setup. We learned a model with 3
states for the old version of the e.dentifier and 4 states for the new version us-
ing 85 and 65 output queries respectively. The equivalence checking using the
random walk method with 50 queries with a length of 4 or 5 input symbols for
each model could not find a counterexample. The whole process took 45 and
30 minutes respectively.
These coarse models, shown in figures 5.5 and 5.6, already have enough detail
to show the flaw in the old version and reveal differences between the old and
new version, as discussed in more detail in Section 5.4.4.
• Next, we learned a more fine-grained model for the new version using
a simple reset and the commands COMBINED INIT, COMBINED PIN,
ROBOT CANCEL, ROBOT OK, SIGNDATA, DISPLAY TEXT, and
GEN CRYPTOGRAM as input alphabet (see Figure 5.7). This time we dis-
tinguished between the EMPTY CRYPTOGRAM and other CRYPTOGRAM
responses. After equivalence checking found counterexamples for two hypoth-
esis models, the final model with 8 states has been verified with 500 random
queries with a length of 6 or 7 input symbols. In total, 578 output queries
and 894 queries for equivalence testing have been performed and the process
took 7:15 hours. For a more extensive test using the test harness implementing
majority voting with equivalence queries of length 10 to 15 and a maximum of
1000 equivalence queries, the random walk method took almost 23 hours for
580 membership and 1091 equivalence queries. Using the same setup, we ran
the W-method for a maximum of 8 states, which took about 88 hours. In this
period, 578 membership queries and 7530 equivalence queries were executed to
determine the final model.
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Initialised
PIN verified
Waiting for confirmation Unconfirmed cryptogram
COMBINED DATA / LONG ERROR —— LONG ERROR
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Figure 5.5: The learned coarse-grained model of the old version of the e.dentifier2.
The initial state is marked with a double ellipse.
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Figure 5.6: The learned coarse-grained model of the new version of the e.dentifier2.
5.4.4 Discussion of obtained models
Figure 5.5 shows the generated state diagram of the old version of the e.dentifier2.
The normal path through the application in case of this input alphabet is:
COMBINED PIN, COMBINED DATA, ROBOT OK, GEN CRYPTOGRAM. It
is also possible to get a cryptogram with the combination COMBINED PIN,
GEN CRYPTOGRAM, which is an empty cryptogram.
The security vulnerability discussed in Section 5.3 occurs in the state waiting for
confirmation, where it is possible to get a cryptogram without pressing the OK button
for the transaction with the following inputs: COMBINED PIN, COMBINED DATA,
GEN CRYPTOGRAM, leading to the state unconfirmed cryptogram.
The state diagram of the new version of the e.dentifier2 (see Figure 5.6) does not
have this additional state unconfirmed cryptogram. So the device lacks this (superflu-
ous) state which causes the security vulnerability. This shows that the vulnerability
present in the old version has been fixed: the only paths through the application that
lead to a valid cryptogram are the legitimate ones that are expected.
To generate a more detailed state model, we refined the inputs as described in
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Section 5.4.3. This leads to more states and paths as shown in Figure 5.7. In this state
diagram, the COMBINED INIT command is used independently from the RESET
command which leads to several uninitialised states. As visible in the model, the
initialised state and the error state are almost the same, except that pressing the
OK or the CANCEL button gives different behaviour. After COMBINED PIN, both
states end up in the PIN verified state. The normal way through the application from
the PIN verified state is: SIGNDATA, DISPLAY TEXT, ROBOT OK and then back
to the initialised state by generating a cryptogram with GEN CRYPTOGRAM. By
repeating the DISPLAY TEXT and the ROBOT OK command, more text can be
added to the signed data for the cryptogram. This is necessary if the user should
confirm more text than fits on the display. Additionally, in the ready to sign state
it is possible to add data for the cryptogram with the SIGNDATA command. The
COMBINED PIN leads to the PIN verified state, no matter if the current state is the
waiting for confirmation or the ready to sign state. In the waiting for confirmation
state, the user is prompted to confirm the data on the display. If the Cancel button
is pressed, the e.dentifier2 is reset to the initialised state as expected.
The fact that there are the states uninitialised1 and uninitialised2 shows that
there is still some strange behaviour but at least it is not possible to generate a
cryptogram by bypassing the confirmation of the user. Also, the error state and the
initialised state could be combined to one state.
When looking at the more detailed model of the old device, we not only discov-
ered the known bug but also additional strange behaviour. The COMBINED INIT
command does not seem to influence a regular protocol run (COMBINED PIN, SIGN-
DATA, DISPLAY TEXT, ROBOT OK and GEN CRYPTOGRAM). It is possible to
start with a protocol run before issuing the COMBINED INIT command and issue
this command at any point before GEN CRYPTOGRAM is executed. This will still
result in a valid cryptogram and the device still displays the text and asks for the PIN
code as usual. There is however no response returned over the USB line yet before the
COMBINED INIT command. This behaviour is no longer present in the new device.
5.4.5 Non-deterministic behaviour
One problematic issue in our experiments was dealing with non-deterministic be-
haviour of the system under test. LearnLib cannot cope with non-deterministic be-
haviour, and will fail to terminate if it encounters non-determinism.
In one instance, non-determinism was traced to one of the buttons of the e.dentifier2
keyboard intermittently malfunctioning, namely the digit button used to enter the
PIN code, probably due to it having been pressed thousands of times by our robot.
We solved this by switching to a different digit for the PIN code.
More problematic was non-deterministic behaviour on the old e.dentifier2 that
showed up in some tests. Randomly, there are 8 unexpected bytes, usually at the
end of an expected response or between two different expected USB responses. This
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Figure 5.7: The learned fine-grained model of the new version of the e.dentifier2 using
the W-method for 8 states.
additional byte sequence normally looks similar to this one: 0281010100000000. The
new e.dentifier2 shows no such behaviour, which leads to the conclusion that there
was not only a security bug fix but also an update of the USB part of the firmware.
The byte sequence might be some error code of the old USB stack. The Python script
on the Raspberry Pi was modified to filter out such ‘error’ bytes to learn the state
machine for the old e.dentifier2.
5.4.6 Conclusions
Using the LearnLib library for state machine learning and our Lego robot, we can
automatically reverse engineer the state machines of handheld smart card readers for
online banking.
The state machines obtained for the different versions of the e.dentifier2 device
immediately reveal differences between different versions, and can be used to spot
the security flaw in the older version. Despite the fact that our Lego robot is rather
slow, it can learn this difference within 45 minutes per device. The state machines
obtained for the new version of the e.dentifier2 show that the security vulnerability
has been fixed there, also when we study the fine-grained model. This confirms the
usefulness of state machine learning as a technique to automatically finding security
flaws in these type of devices.
As the set-up is fully automated, it can be used to perform very thorough tests to
look for unwanted behaviour; here we can learn more detailed behaviour, for example
to check for the presence of insecure or unneeded behaviour in the newer, patched
version. Of course, there are limits to what can be done with such automated state
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machine inference: we cannot hope to find a well-hidden malicious backdoor, but we
can expect to find accidental flaws in the programming logic.
Although the new device does not contain the old flaw, the more detailed state
machine obtained for the new device (see Figure 5.7) is still surprisingly complex. To
reduce the potential for things going wrong (as they clearly have done in the past),
we wonder whether it would not be better, already from the early design phase, to
try and keep the protocol state machine as simple as possible.
Apart from confirming the security fix in the new version of the e.dentifier2, the
differences in presence of non-deterministic behaviour between the old and new version
suggest that the new firmware not only contains the security fix but also improvements
in the USB driver, as the new version no longer generates intermittent errors in the
USB traffic.
Chapter 6
Radboud Reader
In this section the design of a device for securing online transactions is presented
[PR13]. This device could be used, for example, for internet banking, where it can
protect against PC malware, including Man-in-the-Browser attacks.
A fundamental problem in securing online transactions is the lack of a trustwor-
thy device to communicate with the human end user. The software on laptops and
PCs, but also smart phones, is so large and complex that security vulnerabilities are
inevitable. This means that these devices are not trustworthy as input or output
channel to communicate to the user (via the display, keyboard or mouse), as malware
can manipulate the display and eavesdrop on any input.
Smart cards are a potential improvement in that they provide a secure computing
platform. The chances of exploitable security vulnerabilities in the software on a
smart card are much lower than for a PC or laptop, given the very small size and
the very limited functionality of the code. The code on a smart card is in the order
of a few kilobytes and offers a very restricted interface, whereas the code of a laptop
or mobile phone operating system is in the order of many megabytes and presents a
huge attack surface for an attacker. However, a serious and fundamental limitation
of smart cards is the lack of a display and keyboard. This means that a smart card
requires some terminal with a display for output and a keyboard for user input, and
this terminal has to be trusted. Still, the first smart cards with keyboard and display
are in commercial use. For these smart cards the size is a limiting factor, i.e. the size
of the display is quite limited and the same holds for the keys that can be used.
Given the issues above, the more secure solutions that use smart cards to secure
online transactions rely on a dedicated smart card reader with a numeric keyboard
and display. The most prominent example is the EMV-CAP standard for internet
banking discussed in Section 5.1. Some of these devices are connected by USB to the
computer, which can both increase user convenience – as the user does not have to
type over numbers to and from the device – and security, by providing a What-You-
See-Is-What-You-Sign guarantee.
In this section an alternative design is presented for a solution, the Radboud
Reader, where we rigorously stick to the design principle that the device should be
as simple as possible. Where possible functionality is moved to the smart card rather
than the reader and the smart card is given control as much as possible. Although
these principles are rather obvious, and the resulting system is quite a natural solution,
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Figure 6.1: Set-up
we are not aware of anyone else proposing a system like this. The resulting system
has some interesting advantages over existing solutions:
• The device is simpler than alternative solutions: it contains no secrets, and does
not need to support any cryptographic operations or even hashing. Keeping the
device simple also reduces the chance of security vulnerabilities in the device.
• Our solution gives stronger security guarantees than most other solutions: the
device provides a trusted display which only displays text approved by the smart
card, so that the smart card can check say a digital signature on any text before
it is displayed.
• The device is generic and can be used in combination with different smart cards
for different purposes.
6.1 Security objectives and high-level design
The basic set-up, shown in Figure 6.1, is the same as with any USB-connected smart
card reader for internet banking: a web browser on a PC communicates with a remote
web server over the internet and with a smart card reader via a USB cable. The smart
card reader has its own display and numeric keypad with two additional buttons
marked ‘OK’ and ‘Cancel’, so the user can interact with both the PC and the reader
for input and output, via their respective displays and keyboards.
The objective is that, unlike the PC, the reader can be a trusted input and output
device, meaning that we rely on
S1 authenticity of whatever is displayed on the display,
S2 confidentiality of anything that is entered on the keyboard,
S3 non-repudiation of any transactions confirmed or declined by pressing ‘OK’ or
‘Cancel’.
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Although a complete transaction might be performed using only the reader, this is
not very user friendly given its limited display and numeric-only keyboard. Therefore,
the PC can still be used to set up the connection to the service provider and enter
the transaction details.
6.2 Attacker model
The attacker is assumed to be in full control of the network and of the PC, including
the USB connection to the reader, but not of the reader or the smart card, and
the communication between them. If one abstracts away from the PC then this is
equivalent to assuming a Dolev-Yao attacker, as discussed in Section 2.2.1, on the
communication between the remote server and the reader.
Our main concern is an online attacker, with possibly total control over the PC,
but without physical access to the reader or the smart card. Attackers with physical
access are only a secondary concern. This means that physical tamper-resistance or
tamper-evidence of the reader is not crucial: they are nice properties to have, but
in practice one will only want to spend a limited amount to realising them to some
degree. Of course, one would want to include protection against shoulder surfing, e.g.
by not echoing say a PIN code on the display as it is entered on the reader.
6.3 High-level design decisions
For the reader to be a trusted input and output device, we will ensure that
• all output on the display comes from the smart card, and
• all input to the device is only sent to the smart card,
as illustrated in Figure 6.2. This means that the smart card can ensure authenticity
of the output to the screen, and confidentiality of the input from the keyboard.
By only allowing the smart card to output to the display, we get a trusted display,
where authenticity of displayed messages can be enforced by the smart card. Allowing
the PC to display text would allow malware on the PC to control the display, even
though the device could still offer the guarantee of WYSIWYS.
So physically the reader is between the smart card and the PC, but logically –
i.e. considering the information flows – the smart card is between the PC and the
reader. One could even consider using physically different contacts on the smart card
for communication with the display and communication with the PC. Two of the
contacts of smart cards are reserved for future use in the ISO/IEC 7816 standard,
so this is possible. However, this would be a more expensive solution requiring non-
standard smart cards.
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Figure 6.2: Information flows in the Radboud Reader. All I/O the device offers to
the user is with the smart card, not the PC, and all communication between the user
and remote server has to pass through the smart card.
For the input the Radboud Reader provides a numeric keyboard as well as an
‘OK’ and ‘Cancel’ button. Output can be displayed on its display consisting of 80
characters (4 x 20).
Note that it is completely up to the smart card to decide what functionality it
provides, and how the data communicated with the PC, and via the PC with the
remote server, is secured. Different strategies are possible here:
• The smart card could set up a secure tunnel to the remote server, analogous to
TLS, ensuring integrity and confidentiality of the entire communication session
between smart card and the remote server. In such a set-up, one could let the
smart card only communicate with the back-end, and not communicate with
the PC at all.
Many smart cards already provide such a secure tunnelling mechanism, called
Secure Messaging in smart card jargon. The ISO/IEC 7816 standard [ISOb]
already describes it, as do many other smart card standards, including the
ICAO standard for electronic passports [ICA08], the EMV standard [EMV08],
and the Global Platform standard [GP06].
• Alternatively, one could choose to sign and/or encrypt parts of messages ex-
changed between the smart card and the remote server on a more piece-meal
basis.
The former approach provides simpler and more robust security. An advantage of
the latter approach might be that the browser can see and display some parts of the
communication between smart card and PC, which in the former approach would
require additional communication between browser and the back-end.
To login to a website using the reader in combination with a smart card, one
could of course let the smart card generate a credential to login, using some challenge-
response protocol. It is even possible to let the smart card supply the username (or
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say, in the case of a bank account, the bank account number) to the remote server
when logging in over a secure tunnel, in which case malware on the PC would not
even be able to learn this. Paper receipts for credit card transaction no longer show
the complete card number but only the last four digits. Similarly, when using the
Radboud Reader in combination with a smart card to log-on to some website, there
is no reason to show the actual login name on the PC’s display if leaking this could
give useful information to an attacker.
Inserting a smart card into a smart card reader that is attached to a (potentially
infected) PC is of course dangerous. Malware on the PC could try to access function-
ality of the smart card in unwanted ways, for example by sending PIN code guesses
to the card, with a small chance of guessing it right, and a big chance of blocking
the card with 3 incorrect guesses. This leads to another security requirement, namely
that access to functionality of the smart card is strictly limited, which we will realise
by ensuring that
S4 Input from the PC is forwarded to the smart card in a specific format so that it
cannot address arbitrary functionality on the card.
Effectively, the reader should provide a firewall between the smart card and the PC,
which only lets minimal functionality through.
That the device uses a USB-connection to a PC to connect to the internet and the
back-end is not essential; any means of connecting the device to the internet could
be used. USB is the obvious choice in that it is widely available, and indeed existing
smart card readers use it. An alternative to this would be to connect with the PC
via Bluetooth. Another (more expensive) alternative would be to simply equip the
device with GSM and let it by-pass the PC completely, though that requires additional
measures to link a session on the device with a session on a PC.
6.4 Functional requirements
To achieve the properties discussed previously, the Radboud Reader needs to provide
the following operations:
1. Starting a session, by selecting the desired application on the smart card; a
smart card can hold several applications, and one has to be selected at the start
of a session.
2. Forwarding data received from the PC to the smart card.
3. Carrying out instructions received from the smart card; these instructions can
tell the reader to
a) display text and wait for the user to press ‘OK’ or ‘Cancel’;
b) display text and wait for user input;
72 6. Radboud Reader
Host PC Radboud Reader Smart Card
data
Received data from PC
Check signature on data
Display transaction details
Display transaction details
Wait for user confirmation
User pressed OK
Request input with ‘Enter PIN’
Display ‘Enter PIN’
Wait for user input
User entered input
Check PIN
Send response to PC
response
Figure 6.3: Typical usage scenario
c) forward data from the smart card back to the PC, and then wait for new
data from the PC.
4. Sending user input from the keyboard to the smart card, following 3a) or 3b).
Using these operations the smart card can then construct any interaction with PC
and the user that it wants. A typical usage scenario would be that the card receives
digitally signed information over the internet and displays this on the device (ensuring
that only genuine messages are displayed) and sends out digitally signed responses (to
authenticate transactions). Of course, data received and sent can also be encrypted
as well as signed to ensure confidentiality. It is up to the smart card to check or add
digital signatures and to en- or decrypt.
Figure 6.3 illustrates such a scenario, where the data from the PC is forwarded to
the card, who subsequently shows transaction data on the display. If the user agrees
with this information, the card requests the PIN code from the user as input. If the
PIN code is correct, the card generates a signature which is sent to the reader to be
forwarded to the PC.
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6.5 Detailed design
To implement the functional requirements described above, several decisions have to
be taken:
(i) How is the applet selected on the smart card?
(ii) How do we forward data to the smart card, when data is received from the PC
(i.e. inPC in Figure 6.2)?
(iii) How is the distinction made between output from the smart card that is (a)
destined for the display, (b) a request for input from the user, and (c) output
destined for the PC (i.e. between outUser and outPC in Figure 6.2)?
(iv) How is input by the user forwarded to the smart card (i.e. inUser in Figure 6.2)?
And how can the card distinguish between data coming from the keyboard and
from the PC (i.e. between inPC and inUser)?
These operations have to be realised at the level of the communication between the
smart card and the reader, as laid down in the ISO/IEC 7816 standard and discussed
in Section 2.1.1. The reader will have to present data to the smart card in such a way
that the smart card can distinguish between inPC and inUser in Figure 6.2. Similarly,
the smart card will have to provide its response in such a way that the reader can
distinguish between options 3a), 3b) and 3c) listed earlier. Because we want the smart
card to be in control as much as possible, these responses from the smart card will
in fact be instructions for the Radboud reader. To avoid confusion with the standard
terminology of commands for messages from the reader to the smart card, we will call
such messages from the smart card to the reader instructions and not commands.
Selecting an application on the smart card Selecting the desired application
could be done in several ways: by fixing a unique AID that is selected and hard-coding
this in the reader, by hard-coding a list of AIDs that the reader attempts to select,
or by letting the reader select the default applet. Letting the PC choose the applet
to select is of course not a good option, as it could be abused by malware on the PC.
For simplicity, we choose to use a fixed AID to select the application on the smart
card. We choose an AID here that is not already used for an existing standard
application. As soon as the smart card is inserted in the reader, the application is
selected.
Forwarding PC communications to the smart card One security-critical piece
of functionality of the device is to provide a kind of firewall to shield the smart card
from malicious actions by the PC. One way of doing this would be to block all traffic
except a minimal white-list or a single instruction. Another would be to prepend data
sent to the smart card with a fixed prefix.
74 6. Radboud Reader
The former approach is a classical method for firewalls. The PC can send APDUs
to the reader, who will forward them to the card only when they are allowed according
to its rules. These rules would have to be fixed for all possible applications, as they
are stored in the reader. (One could make this APDU firewall configurable, with
configuration controlled by the smart card, but this introduces a lot of complexity.)
Therefore it needs to be decided in advance what APDUs might be necessary and can
be allowed to pass through.
We choose the latter approach, where the data received from the PC is wrapped
as payload in an APDU with a dedicated instruction. Using this approach, the reader
does not have to process the data it receives in any way: it simply forwards commu-
nication received from the terminal with a fixed prefix.
This approach does not work with existing smart card applications, but it is
possible to reuse these applications with only minor modifications. However, this
should be done with care, since just unwrapping the APDU received by the smart
card and executing it without any checking of the operation poses a serious security
risk.
We are free to choose the prefix, but we should make sure this prefix does not
have a meaning already in the ISO/IEC 7816 standard. Otherwise the reader could
accidentally trigger functionality in a smart card that was not designed to be used
with the USB reader.
Ideally, the display and keyboard are disconnected before USB connection is con-
nected, and only reconnected after the USB connection has been disconnected, to
avoid any way for the USB connection to influence or observe the display or key-
board.
6.5.1 Format of data sent to the smart card
As explained above, the reader will simply forward data from the PC to the smart
card – i.e. inPC in Figure 6.2 – with a fixed prefix. For user input on the device –
inUser– the reader will use a different prefix, so that the card can distinguish between
them. Figure 6.4 gives the data formats for this, which use the constants INS DATA and
INS USER INPUT as the instruction byte (the second byte of the command APDUs):
• INS DATA indicates that the APDU contains data forwarded from the PC. The
data that is received from the PC is wrapped in an APDU and forwarded as it
is.
• INS USER INPUT indicates that the APDU contains user input entered on the
keyboard. The first byte of the data indicates whether the ‘OK’ or ‘Cancel’
button was pressed and, in case that ‘OK’ was pressed, the rest of the data
gives the user input.
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CLA INS DATA 00 00 Le data0 data1 · · ·
CLA INS USER INPUT 00 00 Le OK / Cancel input0 input1 · · ·
Figure 6.4: Data formats for the Command APDUs to pass PC data and user input
to the card.
6.5.2 Format of data sent by the smart card
The three instructions that the smart card can give to the reader use the data formats
presented in Figure 6.5, where the first byte specifies the instruction:
• RESP DISPLAY instructs the reader to display the text returned by the smart
card. The text to be displayed should not be longer than 80 characters for our
prototype and is supplied after the RESP DISPLAY instruction. When displaying
data following a RESP DISPLAY instruction, the reader waits for the user to
either press ‘OK’ or ‘Cancel’. This input is then sent to the smart card using
the INS USER INPUT command.
• RESP REQUEST INPUT instructs the reader to request user input. The second byte
indicates whether input should be echoed, i.e. if the user can see the input on the
screen or only masked characters. The third byte indicates the maximum input
length. A string is appended to this that will be shown before the input. The
length of this string together with the maximum input length cannot be longer
than 80 characters for our prototype. After receiving a RESP REQUEST INPUT
instruction, the reader lets the user input data using the keypad. The reader
uses a INS USER INPUT instruction to return the result to the smart card.
• RESP DATA instructs the reader to forward the data returned by the smart card
to the PC and wait for new data from the PC.
After each command sent to the smart card, the card can respond with a new instruc-
tion, making it possible to perform multiple RESP DISPLAY and RESP REQUEST INPUT
instructions before finally returning data to the PC using the RESP DATA instruction.
6.6 Prototype reader
To show the functionality of the Radboud Reader, we constructed a prototype using
the Arduino platform1 (see Figure 6.6). The code is approximately 350 lines and the
components cost around 50 Euro. This prototype demonstrates the feasibility of the
1http://www.arduino.cc
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RESP DISPLAY text0 text1 · · ·
RESP REQUEST INPUT echo on/off length input text0 text1 · · ·
RESP DATA data0 data1 · · ·
Figure 6.5: Data formats for the Response APDUs that provide instructions of the
smart card to the reader
Figure 6.6: Prototype based on Arduino platform
approach and developing it was a useful exercise to make sure we resolved all imple-
mentation and design choices that have to be made in realising an implementation.
Using this prototype protocols can be developed and tested.
We implemented one sample protocol on an actual smart card. The protocol
provides integrity and confidentiality of communication between the smart card and
the issuer. For this, the smart card contains a symmetric key, that is shared with the
issuer, an asymmetric key pair and the public key of the issuer. The issuer knows the
shared symmetric key, the public key of the smart card and its own asymmetric key
pair.
The issuer starts the protocol by sending a command to initialise the protocol.
The smart card responds by sending a nonce and his identity, encrypted using the
public key of the issuer. In response the issuer sends the smart card’s nonce together
with its own nonce, both encrypted using the public key of the smart card, back.
The smart card will then generate a random session key, which it encrypts using its
shared symmetric key. To ensure integrity of the session key, as it is a random string,
a MAC is computed over the encryption.
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After the session key is established, so-called Secure Messaging is used to provide
confidentiality and integrity of the communication session between the smart card
and issuer, as in an Secure Shell (SSH) or TLS tunnel. The Session Sequence Counter
(SSC), that is used to prevent replay, is initialised to the concatenation of the nonces
of the issuer and the smart card. With Secure Messaging, first the data is encrypted
using the session key. Subsequently a MAC is computed over the encrypted data. To
prevent replays, the first block that is processed in the computation of the MAC is
the SSC, whose value is increased by one after each message.
6.7 Differences with existing devices
To compare our approach with existing devices, several security features can be taken
into consideration:
1. The device may guaranteeWhat-You-See-Is-What-You-Sign (i.e. guarantee that
the transaction details shown on the display are in fact what is signed), but it
may also provide a trusted display that can guarantee that any data shown on
the display is authentic (i.e. originates from the service provider).
2. The device can support cryptographic operations, increasing the complexity of
the device.
3. The device can include secrets, for instance in the form of secret keys (in case
that the device can do cryptographic operations). But it is also possible that
the functionality of the device is (partly) secret, in which case we may not be
able to tell if it contains say a secret key or if it simply contains some unknown
use of a hash function.
4. The device may be unconnected, and not provide any means of communication
between it and the PC, or, in case it does, this communication may be bidi-
rectional (e.g., in the case of USB), or uni-directional (e.g., in the case of optic
communication from the PC to the device).
5. Finally, there is the question of how generic the device is, i.e. whether the device
can be used for several purposes and users.
For some of these characteristics one can still argue whether they improve or weaken
security. E.g., having secrets in the device makes it harder to produce a fake version
or a software implementation of the devices, but makes generic use harder.
Table 7.2 gives a comparison of different devices based on these features. Below
we discuss these devices in more detail.
Manufacturers typically do not publish technical details about the devices they
produce, (though they do sometimes apply for patents, e.g. [Gul10]). This means
that for some devices we do not know all the features, unless the working has been
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reverse-engineered. Ideally vendors would provide this kind of information publicly
so the clients can make a better comparison between different devices.
Unconnected smart card readers with a display and keyboard are widely used for
online banking. Many of these systems use EMV-CAP, discussed in Section 5.1. This
has advantages, namely that existing EMV smart card implementations, which may
have undergone costly security certifications, can be re-used, but also introduces the
risk of ambiguities in different meanings of the same protocol messages [DMA09].
Some banks already use a USB-connected reader for internet banking. Companies
supplying solutions for this include VASCO and Gemalto. As far as we know, none
of these devices provide a trusted display: they display data that is received over
the USB cable in plaintext without any integrity checks. This means that malware
on an infected PC could show anything it wants, and could even use the display of
the reader as part of a sophisticated phishing attack. Even if these devices do not
guarantee that what is shown on the display is authentic in any way, they can provide
WYSIWYS by sending the displayed text to the card to be signed.
The vulnerability in the e.dentifier2, discussed in Section 5.3, demonstrates once
again the danger in relying on closed, proprietary solutions. It also provides further
support for our design philosophy of keeping the device as simple as possible.
The Zone Trusted Information Channel, or ZTIC2 from IBM comes close to our
approach in the security it provides [WKH+08]. The ZTIC is a small USB-connect
smart card reader with a small display and allows user input by means of two buttons
(for OK and Not OK) and a wheel that can be turned to input numbers. Unlike
the Radboud Reader, the ZTIC has cryptographic capabilities and the keys and cer-
tificates to set up a secure TLS tunnel between the ZTIC and a remote web server.
Every device has its own certificates for mutual authentication with the issuer.
One difference between the ZTIC and our proposal is that the ZTIC is a more
complicated device, capable of storing keys and doing crypto. Unlike our solution,
which is generic and can be used in conjunction with any smart card with a suitable
application, the ZTIC needs to have the certificate for each service provider in order
to communicate with it. Another difference, and possible advantage of the ZTIC, is
that the common functionality to provide a secure tunnel is provided by the ZTIC,
and need not be provided by each smart card used with the Radboud Reader: using
the ZTIC it is guaranteed to have a secure tunnel, using the Radboud Reader this
still depends on the smart card.
The FINREAD project proposed a standardised trusted card reader [FIN04]. This
idea never became a success, probably because the FINREAD card reader would be
too expensive and complex; they were meant to be tamper-resistant and included a
PKI support for controlling applications on them.
2See http://www.zurich.ibm.com/ztic. Originally, ZTIC stood for Zurich Trusted Information
Channel.
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Trusted display Crypto Secrets Connected Generic
EMV-CAP reader ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗
e.dentifier2 ✗ ✗ ✓a ↔ ✗
ZTIC ✓ ✓ ✓b ↔ ✗
FINREAD ✓ ✓ ✓b ↔ ✓
AGSES ? ✓ ✓b,c → ✗
Radboud Reader ✓ ✗ ✗ ↔ ✓
a Unknown functionality
b Secret key
c Uses fingerprints rather than PIN code
Table 6.1: Comparison with existing readers
The AGSES card reader3 does not use a USB connection, but receives data via
a flickering barcode on the PC screen. There is no communication back from this
reader to the PC, so the user has to manually type in the response again. We do not
know if the data sent using the flickering bar code is checked for authenticity before
it is displayed.
Nowadays, smart cards with integrated keyboard and display are also commercially
available. These displays are however very limited, for example, the smart card offered
by NagraID4 only contains 6 characters.
A solution without even a reader is mTAN. Here the user receives an SMS on
his mobile phone with transaction details and a code to confirm it. Here the phone
could be seen as a trusted display. However, as mobile phones become more and more
complex, they are now becoming popular targets for malware and attacks just like
PCs.
6.8 Conclusions
The number and importance of online transactions is rapidly growing, and protecting
such transactions in the face of ever more sophisticated malware is a serious challenge.
This is not only an issue in online banking, but also in e-government services, or
indeed any online transactions where one would really want the online equivalent of
a handwritten signature.
3http://www.agses.net
4http://www.nagraid.com
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In this chapter the design of a simple and generic device for securing online trans-
actions was presented, which protects against any malware on the PC, including
Man-in-the-Browser attacks. The device provides a trusted communication channel
between a user and any remote service provider, by means of a smart card issued by
that provider.
The essence of our solution, as illustrated in Figure 6.2, is quite simple: namely,
make sure that all communication with the user passes through the smart card. We
are not aware of any solutions that use this approach, even though conceptually it
is quite simple. This solution allows a very simple device, which does not need any
cryptographic capabilities or need not store any keys or other secrets.
Because there are no secrets in the Radboud Reader, e.g. in the form of secret
keys or secret protocols, anyone can make one. This can be considered a disadvantage
(an attacker could make or market fake devices) but also an advantage, as anyone can
implement their own device. Note that there is little incentive for manufacturers of
smart card readers to come up with solution like ours, where there is no intellectual
property or secret in the device, thus allowing anyone to manufacture it and not
having any risk of vendor lock-in.
As discussed in detail in Section 6.7, the Radboud Reader offers stronger security
than many existing USB-connected smart card readers with display and keyboard
used for internet banking, except IBM’s ZTIC, as these solutions do not offer provide
a trusted display, i.e. they can not guarantee that what appears on the display is an
authentic message from the remote server.
Unlike other solutions, our solution is completely generic. The functionality hard-
coded in the reader only provides some basic building blocks and the smart card is
in charge of using these to build the scenario that some service requires. So the same
device can be used by different smart cards for different purposes. As the number of
online services that require a high-security solution to secure transactions increases,
investing in a single reader that can be used for all of them may prove a practical
and economical solution. It may then also become an option to go for a slightly
more expensive device, with a larger display; one could even imagine an e-reader for
digitally signing electronic documents that operates in the same way as the Radboud
Reader, though the limited bandwidth of communication with the smart card could
then become a bottleneck.
Chapter 7
Analysing TLS
In this chapter we discuss the analysis of TLS implementations using protocol state
fuzzing, making use of LearnLib for the inference of the state machines. This chapter
is based on [RP15].
TLS, short for Transport Layer Security, is widely used to secure network con-
nections, for example in HTTPS. Being one of the most widely used security pro-
tocols, TLS has been the subject of a lot of research and many issues have been
identified. These range from cryptographic attacks (such as problems when using
RC4 [ABP+13]) to serious implementation bugs (such as Heartbleed [Cod]) and tim-
ing attacks (for example, Lucky Thirteen and variations of the Bleichenbacher at-
tack [AP13,MSW+14,Ble98]).
7.1 Related work
Various formal methods have been used to analyse different parts and properties of
the TLS protocol [Pau99,DCVP04,HSD+05,OF05,GMP+08,MSW10,KL11,JKSS12,
KPW13]. However, these analyses look at abstract descriptions of TLS, not actual
implementations, and in practice many security problems with TLS have been due to
mistakes in implementation [MS14]. To bridge the gap between the specification and
implementation, formally verified TLS implementations have been proposed [BFCZ08,
BFK+13].
Existing tools to analyse TLS implementations mainly focus on fuzzing of individ-
ual messages, in particular the certificates that are used. These certificates have been
the source of numerous security problems in the past. An automated approach to test
for vulnerabilities in the processing of certificates is using Frankencerts as proposed by
Brubaker et al. [BJR+14] or using the tool x509test1. Fuzzing of individual messages
is orthogonal to the technique we propose as it targets different parts or aspects of
the code. However, the results of our analysis could be used to guide fuzzing of mes-
sages by indicating protocol states that might be interesting places to start fuzzing
messages.
Another category of tools analyses implementations by looking at the particular
1https://github.com/yymax/x509test
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configuration that is used. Examples of this are the SSL Server Test2 and sslmap3.
Finally, closely related research on the implementation of state machines for TLS
was done by Beurdouche et al. [BBFK+15]. We compare their work with ours in
Section 7.6.
7.2 The TLS protocol
The TLS protocol was originally known as Secure Socket Layer (SSL), which was de-
veloped at Netscape. SSL 1.0 was never released and version 2.0 contained numerous
security flaws [TP11]. This lead to the development of SSL 3.0, on which all later
versions are based. After SSL 3.0, the name was changed to TLS and currently three
versions are published: 1.0, 1.1 and 1.2 [DA99,DR06,DR08]. The specifications for
these versions are published in RFCs issued by the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF).
To establish a secure connection, different subprotocols are used within TLS:
• The Handshake protocol is used to establish session keys and parameters and
to optionally authenticate the server and/or client.
• The ChangeCipherSpec protocol – consisting of only one message – is used to
indicate the start of the use of established session keys.
• To indicate errors or notifications, the Alert protocol is used to send the level
of the alert (either warning or fatal) and a one byte description.
In Figure 7.1 a normal flow for a TLS session is given. In the ClientHello message,
the client indicates the desired TLS version, supported cipher suites and optional
extensions. A cipher suite is a combination of algorithms used for the key exchange,
encryption, and MAC computation. During the key exchange a premaster secret is
established. This premaster secret is used in combination with random values from
both the client and server to derive the master secret. This master secret is then
used to derive the actual keys that are used for encryption and MAC computation.
Different keys are used for messages from the client to the server and for messages
in the opposite direction. Optionally, the key exchange can be followed by client
verification where the client proves it knows the private key corresponding to the
public key in the certificate it presents to the server. After the key exchange and
optional client verification, a ChangeCipherSpec message is used to indicate that
from that point on the agreed keys will be used to encrypt all messages and add
a MAC to them. The Finished message is finally used to conclude the handshake
phase. It contains a keyed hash, computed using the master secret, of all previously
exchanged handshake messages. Since it is sent after the ChangeCipherSpec message
2https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/
3https://www.thesprawl.org/projects/sslmap/
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it is the first message that is encrypted and MACed. After the handshake phase,
application data can be exchanged over the established secure channel.
To add additional functionality, TLS offers the possibility to add extensions to
the protocol. One example of such an extension is the – due to Heartbleed [Cod] by
now well-known – Heartbeat Extension, which can be used to keep a connection alive
using HeartbeatRequest and HeartbeatResponse messages [STW12].
Client Server
ClientHello
ServerHello;
[Certificate;]
[ServerKeyExchange;]
[CertificateRequest;]
ServerHelloDone
ClientKeyExchange;
[Certificate;]
[CertificateVerify;]
ChangeCipherSpec;
{Finished}
ChangeCipherSpec;
{Finished}
{ApplicationData}
{ApplicationData}
Figure 7.1: A regular TLS session. An encrypted message m is denoted as {m}. If
message m is optional, this is indicated by [m].
7.3 Learning
To infer the state machines of implementations of the TLS protocol we used Learn-
Lib. For the equivalence checking we use an improved version of Chow’s W-method
[Cho78]. The W-method is guaranteed to be correct given an upper bound for the
number of states. For LearnLib we can specify a depth for the equivalence checking:
given a hypothesis for the state machine, the upper bound for the W-method is set
to the number of found states plus the specified depth. The W-method is very pow-
erful but comes at a high cost in terms of performance. Therefore we improved the
algorithm to take advantage of a property of the system we learn, namely that once a
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connection is closed, all outputs returned afterwards will be the same (namely Con-
nection closed). So when looking for counterexamples, extending a trial trace that
results in the connection being closed is pointless. The W-method, however, will still
look for counterexamples by extending traces which result in a closed connection. We
improved the W-method by adding a check to see if it makes sense to continue search-
ing for counterexamples with a particular prefix, and for this we simply check if the
connection has not been closed. This simple modification of the W-method greatly
reduced the number of equivalence queries needed, as we will see in Section 7.5.
7.4 Test harness
To use LearnLib, we need to fix an input alphabet of messages that can be sent to
the SUT. This alphabet is an abstraction of the actual messages sent. In our analyses
we use different input alphabets depending on whether we test a client or server, and
whether we perform a more limited or more extensive analysis. To test servers we
support the following messages: ClientHello (RSA and DHE), Certificate (RSA and
empty), ClientKeyExchange, ClientCertificateVerify, ChangeCipherSpec, Finished,
ApplicationData (regular and empty), HeartbeatRequest and HeartbeatResponse. To
test clients we support the following messages: ServerHello (RSA and DHE), Cer-
tificate (RSA and empty), CertificateRequest, ServerKeyExchange, ServerHelloDone,
ChangeCipherSpec, Finished, ApplicationData (regular and empty), HeartbeatRequest
and HeartbeatResponse.
We thus support all regular TLS messages as well as the messages for the Heartbeat
Extension. The test harness supports both TLS version 1.2 and, in order to test older
implementations, version 1.0. The input alphabet is not fixed, but can be configured
per analysis as desired. For the output alphabet we use all the regular TLS messages
as well as the messages from the Alert protocol that can be returned. This is extended
with some special symbols that correspond with exceptions that can occur in the test
harness:
• Empty, this is returned if no data is received from the SUT before a timeout
occurs in the test harness.
• Decryption failed, this is returned if decryption fails in the test harness after
a ChangeChipherSpec message was received. This could happen, for example,
if not enough data is received, the padding is incorrect after decryption (e.g.
because a different key was used for encryption) or the MAC verification fails.
• Connection closed, this is returned if a socket exception occurs or the socket is
closed.
LearnLib uses these abstract inputs and outputs as labels on the transitions of the
state machine. To interact with an actual TLS server or client we need a test harness
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that translates the abstract input messages to actual TLS packets and the responses
back to abstract responses. As we make use of cryptographic operations in the pro-
tocol, we needed to introduce state in our test harness, for instance to keep track of
the information used in the key exchange and the actual keys that result from this.
Apart from this, the test harness also has to remember whether a ChangeCipherSpec
was received or sent, as we have to encrypt and MAC all corresponding data after
this message. Note that we only need a single test harness for TLS to then be able
to analyse any implementation. Our test harness can be considered a ‘stateless’ TLS
implementation.
When testing a server, the test harness is initialised by sending a ClientHello
message to the SUT to retrieve the server’s public key and preferred ciphersuite.
When a reset command is received we set the internal variables to these values. This
is done to prevent null pointer exceptions that could otherwise occur when messages
are sent in the wrong order.
After sending a message the test harness waits to receive responses from the SUT.
As the SUT will not always send a response, for example because it may be waiting
for a next message, the test harness will generate a timeout after a fixed period.
Some implementations require longer timeouts as they can be slower in responding.
As the timeout has a significant impact on the total running time we varied this per
implementation.
To test client implementations we need to launch a client for every test sequence.
This is done automatically by the test harness upon receiving the reset command.
The test harness then waits to receive the ClientHello message, after which the client
is ready to receive a query. Because the first ClientHello is received before any query
is issued, this message does not appear explicitly in the learned models.
7.5 Results
We analysed the nine different implementations listed in Table 7.1. We used demo
client and server applications that came with the different implementations except
with the Java Secure Socket Extension (JSSE). For JSSE we wrote simple server and
client applications. For the implementations listed the models of the server-side were
learned using our modified W-method for the following alphabet: ClientHello (RSA),
Certificate (empty), ClientKeyExchange, ChangeCipherSpec, Finished, Application-
Data (regular and empty), HeartbeatRequest. For completeness we learned models
for both TLS version 1.0 and 1.2, when available, but this always resulted in the same
model.
Due to space limitations we cannot include the models for all nine implementa-
tions in this paper, but we do include the models in which we found security issues
(for GnuTLS, Java Secure Socket Extension, and OpenSSL), and the model of RSA
BSAFE for Java to illustrate how much simpler the state machine can be. The models
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regular modified W-method 0:09 7 456 1347
full modified W-method 0:27 9 1573 4126
full original W-method 4:09 9 1573 68578
Table 7.2: Analysis of the GnuTLS 3.3.12 server using different alphabets and equiv-
alence algorithms
and the code of our test harness. We wrote a Python application to automatically
simplify the models by combining transitions with the same responses and replacing
the abstract input and output symbols with more readable names. Table 7.3 shows
the times needed to obtain these state machines, which ranged from about 9 minutes
to over 8 hours.
A comparison between our modified equivalence algorithm and the original W-
method can be found in Table 7.2. This comparison is based on the analysis of
GnuTLS 3.3.12 running a TLS server. It is clear that by taking advantage of the
state of the socket our algorithm performs much better than the original W-method:
the number of equivalence queries is over 15 times smaller for our method when
learning a model for the server.
When analysing a model, we first manually look if there are more paths than
expected that lead to a successful exchange of application data. Next we determine
whether the model contains more states than necessary and identify unexpected or
superfluous transitions. We also check for transitions that can indicate interesting
behaviour such as, for example, a ’Bad record MAC’ alert or a Decryption failed
message. If we come across any unexpected behaviour, we perform a more in-depth
analysis to determine the cause and severity.
An obvious first observation is that all the models of server-side implementations
are very different. For example, note the huge difference between the models learned
for RSA BSAFE for Java in Figure 7.9 and for OpenSSL in Figure 7.11. Because all
the models are different, they provide a unique fingerprint of each implementation,
which could be used to remotely identify the implementation that a particular server
is using.
Most demo applications close the connection after their first response to applica-
tion data. In the models there is then only one ApplicationData transition where ap-
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GnuTLS 3.3.8 12 100ms 0:45 1370 5613
GnuTLS 3.3.12 7 100ms 0:09 456 1347
mbed TLS 1.3.10 8 100ms 0:39 520 2939
OpenSSL 1.0.1g + 16 100ms 0:31 1016 4171
OpenSSL 1.0.1j + 11 100ms 0:16 680 2348
OpenSSL 1.0.1l + 10 100ms 0:14 624 2249
OpenSSL 1.0.2 + 7 100ms 0:06 350 902
JSSE 1.8.0 25 9 200ms 0:41 584 2458
JSSE 1.8.0 31 9 200ms 0:39 584 2176
miTLS 0.1.3 6 1500ms 0:53 392 517
NSS 3.17.4 8 500ms 3:16 520 5329
RSA BSAFE for Java 6.1.1 6 500ms 0:18 392 517
RSA BSAFE for C 4.0.4 9 200ms 8:16 584 26353
nqsb-TLS 0.4.0 + 8 100ms 0:15 399 1835
+Without heartbeat extension
Table 7.3: Results of the automated analysis of server implementations for the regular
alphabet of inputs using our modified W-method with depth 2
plication data is exchanged instead of the expected cycle consisting of an Application-
Data transition that allows server and client to continue exchanging application data
after a successful handshake.
In the subsections below we discuss the peculiarities of models we learned, and
the flaws they revealed. Correct paths leading to an exchange of application data are
indicated by thick green transitions in the models. If there is any additional path
leading to the exchange of application data this is a security flaw and indicated by a
dashed red transition.
7.5.1 GnuTLS
Figure 7.2 shows the model that was learned for GnuTLS 3.3.8. In this model there
are two paths leading to a successful exchange of application data: the regular one
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Figure 7.2: Learned state machine model for GnuTLS 3.3.8
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Figure 7.3: Learned state machine model for GnuTLS 3.3.12. A comparison with the
model for GnuTLS 3.3.8 in Figure 7.2 shows that the superflous states (8, 9, 10, and
11) are now gone, confirming that the code has been improved.
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without client authentication and one where an empty client certificate is sent dur-
ing the handshake. As we did not require client authentication, both are acceptable
paths. What is immediately clear is that there are more states than expected. Closer
inspection reveals that there is a ‘shadow’ path, which is entered by sending a Heart-
beatRequest message during the handshake protocol. The handshake protocol then
does proceed, but eventually results in a fatal alert (‘Internal error’) in response to
the Finished message (from state 8 ). From every state in the handshake protocol
it is possible to go to a corresponding state in the ‘shadow’ path by sending the
HeartbeatRequest message. This behaviour is introduced by a security bug, which
we will discuss below. Additionally there is an redundant state 5, which is reached
from states 3 and 9 when a ClientHello message is sent. From state 5 a fatal alert is
given to all subsequent messages that are sent. One would expect to already receive
an error message in response to the ClientHello message itself.
Forgetting the buffer in a heartbeat As mentioned above, HeartbeatRequest
messages are not just ignored in the handshake protocol but cause some side effect:
sending a HeartbeatRequest during the handshake protocol will cause the implemen-
tation to return an alert message in response to the Finished message that terminates
the handshake. Further inspection of the code revealed the cause: the implementation
uses a buffer to collect all handshake messages in order to compute a hash over these
messages when the handshake is completed, but this buffer is reset upon receiving
the heartbeat message. The alert is then sent because the hashes computed by server
and client no longer match.
This bug can be exploited to effectively bypass the integrity check that relies on
comparing the keyed hashes of the messages in the handshake: when also resetting
this buffer on the client side (i.e. our test harness) at the same time we were able
to successfully complete the handshake protocol, but then no integrity guarantee is
provided on the previous handshake messages that were exchanged.
By learning the state machine of a GnuTLS client we confirmed that the same
problem exists when using GnuTLS as a client.
This problem was reported to the developers of GnuTLS and is fixed in version
3.3.9. By learning models of newer versions, we could confirm the issue is no longer
present, as can be seen in Figure 7.3.
To exploit this problem both sides would need to reset the buffer at the same
time. This might be hard to achieve as at any time either one of the two parties
is computing a response, at which point it will not process any incoming message.
If an attacker would successfully succeed to exploit this issue no integrity would be
provided on any message sent before, meaning a fallback attack would be possible,
for example to an older TLS version or weaker cipher suite.
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Figure 7.4: Learned state machine model for mbed TLS 1.3.10
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7.5.2 mbed TLS
For mbed TLS, previously known as PolarSSL, we tested version 1.3.10 (see Fig-
ure 7.4). We saw several paths leading to a successful exchange of data. Instead
of sending a regular ApplicationData message, it is possible to first send one empty
ApplicationData message after which it is still possible to send the regular Applica-
tionData message. Sending two empty ApplicationData messages directly after each
other will close the connection. However, if in between these message an unexpected
handshake message is sent, the connection will not be closed and only a warning is
returned. After this it is also still possible to send a regular ApplicationData message.
While this is strange behaviour, it does not seem to be exploitable.
7.5.3 Java Secure Socket Extension
For Java Secure Socket Extension we analysed Java version 1.8.0 25. The model con-
tains several paths leading to a successful exchange of application data and contains
more states than expected (see Figure 7.5). This is the result of a security issue which
we will discuss below.
As long as no Finished message has been sent it is apparently possible to keep
renegotiating. After sending a ClientKeyExchange, other ClientHello messages are
accepted as long as they are eventually followed by another ClientKeyExchange mes-
sage. If no ClientKeyExchange message was sent since the last ChangeCipherSpec, a
ChangeCipherSpec message will result in an error (state 7 ). Otherwise it either leads
to an error state if sent directly after a ClientHello (state 8 ) or a successful change of
keys after a ClientKeyExchange.
Accepting plaintext data More interesting is that the model contains two paths
leading to the exchange of application data. One of these is a regular TLS protocol
run, but in the second path the ChangeCipherSpec message from the client is omitted.
Despite the server not receiving a ChangeCipherSpec message it still responds with
a ChangeCipherSpec message to a plaintext Finished message by the client. As a
result the server will send its data encrypted, but it expects data from the client to
be unencrypted. A similar problem occurs when trying to negotiate new keys. By
skipping the ChangeCipherSpec message and just sending the Finished message the
server will start to use the new keys, whereas the client needs to continue to use its
old keys.
This bug invalidates any assumption of integrity or confidentiality of data sent
to the server, as it can be tricked into accepting plaintext data. To exploit this
issue it is, for example, possible to include this behaviour in a rogue library. As the
attack is transparent to applications using the connection, both the client and server
application would think they talk on a secure connection, where in reality anyone on
the line could read the client’s data and tamper with it. Figure 7.6 shows a protocol
run where this bug is triggered. The bug was report to Oracle and is identified by
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Figure 7.5: Learned state machine model for JSSE 1.8.0 25
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Client Server
ClientHello
ServerHello;
Certificate;
ServerHelloDone
ClientKeyExchange;
Finished
ChangeCipherSpec;
{Finished}
ApplicationData
{ApplicationData}
Figure 7.6: A protocol run triggering a bug in the JSSE, causing the server to accept
plaintext application data.
CVE-2014-6593. A fix was released in their Critical Security Update in January 2015.
By analysing JSSE version 1.8.0 31 we are able to confirm the issue was indeed fixed.
This issue was identified in parallel by Beurdouche et al. [BBFK+15], who also
reported the same and a related issue for the client-side. By learning the client,
we could confirm that the issue was also present there. Moreover, after receiving the
ServerHello message, the client would accept the Finish message and start exchanging
application data at any point during the handshake protocol. This makes it possible to
completely circumvent both server authentication and the confidentiality and integrity
of the data being exchanged.
7.5.4 miTLS
MiTLS is a formally verified TLS implementation written in F# [BFK+13]. For
miTLS 0.1.3, initially our test harness had problems to successfully complete the
handshake protocol and the responses seemed to be non-deterministic because some-
times a response was delayed and appeared to be received in return to the next
message. To solve this, the timeout had to be increased considerably when waiting
for incoming messages to not miss any message. This means that compared to the
other implementations, miTLS was relatively slow in our setup. Additionally, miTLS
requires the Secure Renegotiation extension to be enabled in the ClientHello mes-
sage. The learned model looks very clean with only one path leading to an exchange
of application data and does not contain more states than expected (see Figure 7.7).
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Figure 7.7: Learned state machine model for miTLS 0.1.3
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7.5.5 RSA BSAFE for C
The RSA BSAFE for C 4.0.4 library resulted in a model containing two paths leading
to the exchange application data (see Figure 7.8). The only difference between the
paths is that an empty ApplicationData is sent in the second path. However, the alerts
that are sent are not very consistent as they differ depending on the state and message.
For example, sending a ChangeCipherSpec message after an initial ClientHello results
in a fatal alert with reason ‘Illegal parameter’, whereas application data results in a
fatal alert with ‘Unexpected message’ as reason. More curious however is a fatal alert
‘Bad record MAC’ that is returned to certain messages after the server received the
ChangeCipherSpec in a regular handshake. As this alert is only returned in response
to certain messages, while other messages are answered with an ‘Unexpected message’
alert, the server is apparently able to successfully decrypt and check the MAC on
messages. Still, an error is returned that it is not able to do this. This seems to be a
non-compliant usage of alert messages.
At the end of the protocol the implementation does not close the connection.
This means we cannot take any advantage from a closed connection in our modified
W-method and the analysis therefore takes much longer than for the other implemen-
tations.
7.5.6 RSA BSAFE for Java
The model for RSA BSAFE for Java 6.1.1 library looks very clean, as can be seen
in Figure 7.9. The model again contains only one path leading to an exchange of
application data and no more states than necessary. In general all received alerts
are ‘Unexpected message’. The only exception is when a ClientHello is sent after a
successful handshake, in which case a ‘Handshake failure’ is given. This makes sense
as the ClientHello message is not correctly formatted for secure renegotiation, which is
required in this case. This model is the simplest that we learned during our research.
7.5.7 Network Security Services
The model for NSS that was learned for version 3.17.4 looks pretty clean (see Fig-
ure 7.10), although there is one more state than one would expect. There is only
one path leading to a successful exchange of application data. In general all mes-
sages received in states where they are not expected are responded to with a fatal
alert (‘Unexpected message’). Exceptions to this are the Finished and Heartbeat
messages: these are ignored and the connection is closed without any alert. Other
exceptions are non-handshake messages sent before the first ClientHello: then the
server goes into a state where the connection stays open but nothing happens any-
more. Although the TLS specification does not explicitly specify what to do in this
case, one would expect the connection to be closed, especially since it’s not possible
to recover from this. Because the connection is not actually closed in this case the
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Figure 7.8: Learned state machine model for RSA BSAFE for C 4.0.4
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Figure 7.9: Learned state machine model for RSA BSAFE for Java 6.1.1
analysis takes longer, as we have less advantage of our modification of the W-method
to decide equivalence.
7.5.8 OpenSSL
Figure 7.11 shows the model inferred for OpenSSL 1.01j. In the first run of the analysis
it turned out that HeartbeatRequest message sent during the handshake phase were
‘saved up’ and only responded to after the handshake phase was finished. As this
results in infinite models we had to remove the heartbeat messages from the input
alphabet. This model obtained contains quite a few more states than expected, but
does only contain one path to successfully exchange application data.
The model shows that it is possible to start by sending two ClientHello messages,
but not more. After the second ClientHello message there is no path to a successful
exchange of application data in the model. This is due to the fact that OpenSSL resets
the buffer containing the handshake messages every time when sending a ClientHello,
whereas our test harness does this only on initialisation of the connection. Therefore,
the hash computed by our test harness at the end of the handshake is not accepted
and the Finished message in state 9 is responded to with an alert. Which messages
are included in the hash differs per implementation: for JSSE all handshake messages
since the beginning of the connection are included.
Re-using keys In state 8 we see some unexpected behaviour. After successfully
completing a handshake, it is possible to send an additional ChangeCipherSpec mes-
sage after which all messages are responded to with a ‘Bad record MAC’ alert. This
usually is an indication of wrong keys being used. Closer inspection revealed that
at this point OpenSSL changes the keys that the client uses to encrypt and MAC
messages to the server keys. This means that in both directions the same keys are
used from this point.
We observed the following behaviour after the additional ChangeCipherSpec mes-
sage. First, OpenSSL expects a ClientHello message (instead of a Finished message
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Figure 7.10: Learned state machine model for NSS 3.17.1
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Figure 7.11: Learned state machine model for OpenSSL 1.0.1j
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as one would expect). This ClientHello is responded to with the ServerHello, Change-
CipherSpec and Finished messages. OpenSSL does change the server keys then, but
does not use the new randoms from the ClientHello and ServerHello to compute new
keys. Instead the old keys are used and the cipher is thus basically reset (i.e. the
original IVs are set and the MAC counter reset to 0). After receiving the ClientHello
message, the server does expect the Finished message, which contains the keyed hash
over the messages since the second ClientHello and does make use of the new client
and server randoms. After this, application data can be send over the connection,
where the same keys are used in both directions. The issue was reported to the
OpenSSL team and was fixed in version 1.0.1k.
Early ChangeCipherSpec The state machine model of the older version OpenSSL
1.0.1g (Figure 7.12) reveals a known vulnerability that was recently discovered [Kik],
which makes it possible for an attacker to easily compute the session keys that are
used in the versions up to 1.0.0l and 1.0.1g, as described below.
As soon as a ChangeCipherSpec message is received, the keys are computed. How-
ever, this also happened when no ClientKeyExchange was sent yet, in which case an
empty master secret is used. This results in keys that are computed based on only
public data. In version 1.0.1 it is possible to completely hijack a session by sending
an early ChangeCipherSpec message to both the server and client, as in this version
the empty master secret is also used in the computation of the hash in the Finished
message. In the model of OpenSSL version 1.0.1g in Figure 7.12 it is clear that if
a ChangeCipherSpec message is received too early, the Finished message is still ac-
cepted as a ChangeCipherSpec is returned (see path 0, 1, 6, 9, 12 in the model).
This is an indication of the bug and would be reason for closer inspection. The in-
coming messages after this path cannot be decrypted anymore however, because the
corresponding keys are only computed by our test harness as soon as the Change-
CipherSpec message is received, which means that these keys are actually based on
the ClientKeyExchange message. A simple modification of the test harness to change
the point at which the keys are computed will even provide a successful exploitation
of the bug.
An interesting observation regarding the evolution of the OpenSSL code is that
for the four different versions that we analysed (1.0.1g, 1.0.1j, 1.0.1l and 1.0.2) the
number of states reduces with every version. For version 1.0.2 there is still one state
more than required, but this is an error state from which all messages result in a
closed connection.
7.5.9 nqsb-TLS
A recent TLS implementation, nqsb-TLS, is intended to be both a specification and
usable implementation written in OCaml [MMMS15]. For nsqb-TLS we analysed
version 0.4.0 (see Figure 7.13). Our analysis revealed a bug in this implementation:
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Figure 7.12: Learned state machine model for OpenSSL 1.0.1g, an older version of
OpenSSL which had a known security flaw [Kik].
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Figure 7.13: Learned state machine model for nqsb-TLS 0.4.0
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alert messages are not encrypted even after a ChangeCipherSpec is received. What
is more interesting is a design decision with regard to the state machine: after the
client sends a ChangeCipherSpec, the server immediately responds with a ChangeCi-
pherSpec. This is different compared to all other implementations, that first wait for
the client to also send a Finished message before sending a response. This is a clear
example where the TLS specifications are not completely unambiguous and adding a
state machine would remove room for interpretation.
7.6 Conclusion
We presented a thorough analysis of commonly used TLS implementations using the
systematic approach we call protocol state fuzzing: we use state machine learning,
which relies only on black box testing, to infer a state machine and then we perform
a manual analysis of the state machines obtained. We demonstrated that this is a
powerful and fast technique to reveal security flaws: in 3 out of 9 tested implementa-
tions we discovered new flaws. We applied the method on both server- and client-side
implementations. By using our modified version of the W-method we are able to
drastically reduce the number of equivalence queries used, which in turn results in a
much lower running time of the analysis.
Our approach is able to find mistakes in the logic in the state machine of im-
plementations. Deliberate backdoors, that are for example triggered by sending a
particular message 100 times, would not be detected. Also mistakes in, for example,
the parsing of messages or certificates would not be detected.
An overview of different approaches to prevent security bugs and more generally
improve the security of software is given in [Whe14] (using the Heartbleed bug as a
basis). The method presented in this paper would not have detected the Heartbleed
bug, but we believe it makes a useful addition to the approaches discussed in [Whe14].
It is related to some of the approaches listed there; in particular, state machine
learning involves a form of negative testing: the tests carried out during the state
machine learning include many negative tests, namely those where messages are sent
in unexpected orders, which one would expect to result in the closing of the connection
(and which probably should result in closing of the connection, to be on the safe side).
By sending messages in an unexpected order we get a high coverage of the code, which
is different from for example full branch code coverage, as we trigger many different
paths through the code.
In parallel with our research Beurdouche et al. [BBFK+15] independently per-
formed closely related research. They also analyse protocol state machines of TLS
implementations and successfully find numerous security flaws. Both approaches have
independently come up with the same fundamental idea, namely that protocol state
machines are a great formalism to systematically analyse implementations of security
protocols. Both approaches require the construction of a framework to send arbitrary
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TLS messages, and both approaches reveal that OpenSSL and JSSE have the most
(over)complicated state machines.
The approach of Beurdouche et al. is different though: whereas we infer the state
machines from the code without prior knowledge, they start with a manually con-
structed reference protocol state machine, and subsequently use this as a basis to test
TLS implementations. Moreover, the testing they do here is not truly random, as
the ‘blind’ learning by LearnLib is, but uses a set of test traces that is automatically
generated using some heuristics.
The difference in the issues identified by Beurdouche et al. and us can partly be
explained by the difference in functionality that is supported by the test frameworks
used. For example, our framework supports the Heartbeat extension, whereas theirs
supports Diffie-Hellman certificates and export cipher suites. Another reason is the
fact that our approach has a higher coverage due to its ‘blind’ nature.
One advantage of our approach is that we don’t have to construct a correct refer-
ence model by hand beforehand. But in the end, we do have to decide which behaviour
is unwanted. Having a visual model helps here, as it is easy to see if there are states
or transitions that seem redundant and don’t occur in other models. Note that both
approaches ultimately rely on a manual analysis to assess the security impact of any
protocol behaviour that is deemed to be deviant or superfluous.
When it comes to implementing TLS, the specifications leave the developer quite
some freedom as how to implement the protocol, especially in handling errors or
exceptions. Indeed, many of the differences between models we infer are variations
in error messages. These are not fixed in the specifications and can be freely chosen
when implementing the protocol. Though this might be useful for debugging, the
different error messages are probably not useful in production (especially since they
differ per implementation).
This means that there is not a single ‘correct’ state machine for the TLS protocol
and indeed every implementation we analysed resulted in a different model. How-
ever, there are some clearly wrong state machines. One would expect to see a state
machine where there is clearly one correct path (or possibly more depending on the
configuration) and all other paths going to one error state – preferably all with the
same error code. We have seen one model that conforms to this, namely the one for
RSA BSAFE for Java, shown in Figure 7.9.
Of course, it would be interesting to apply the same technique we have used on
TLS implementations here on implementations of other security protocols. The main
effort in protocol state fuzzing is developing a test harness. But as only one test
harness is needed to test all implementations for a given protocol, we believe that this
is a worthwhile investment. In fact, one can argue that for any security protocol such
a test harness should be provided to allow analysis of implementations.
The first manual analysis of the state machines we obtain is fairly straightforward:
any superfluous strange behaviour is easy to spot visually. This step could even be
automated as well by providing a correct reference state machine. A state machine
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that we consider to be correct would be the one that we learned for RSA BSAFE for
Java.
Deciding whether any superfluous behaviour is exploitable is the hardest part of
the manual analysis, but for security protocols it makes sense to simply require that
there should not be any superfluous behaviour whatsoever.
The difference behaviour between the various implementations might be traced
back to Postel’s Law:
‘Be conservative in what you send,
be liberal in what you accept.’
As has been noted many times before, e.g. in [SPB12], this is an unwanted and risky
approach in security protocols: if there is any suspicion about inputs they should be
discarded, connections should be closed, and no response should be given that could
possibly aid an attacker. To quote [Gee10]: ‘It’s time to deprecate Jon Postel’s dictum
and to be conservative in what you accept’.
Of course, ideally state machines would be included in the official specifications
of protocols to begin with. This would provide a more fundamental solution to re-
move – or at least reduce – some of the implementation freedom. It would avoid
each implementer having to come up with his or her own interpretation of English
prose specifications, avoiding not only lots of work, but also the large variety of state
machines in implementations that we observed, and the bugs that some of these in-
troduce.

Chapter 8
Conclusions
In this thesis we have shown, using the EMV protocol as a case study, that even though
real world security protocols can be very complex, it is still possible to analyse them
using formal methods. Though using pi-calculus directly was no longer feasible, a
functional language such as F# is powerful enough to specify the protocol and existing
tools can still be used to perform the analysis. The main advantage of F# is that it
provides sequential if-statements and functions. This provides the flexibility required
to formalise a protocol like EMV that offers many options. This does raise the question
whether these protocols cannot be simpler. Due to backwards compatibility it might
be necessary to support old functionality, but with contactless EMV – the new EMV
variant for contactless smart cards – for example, support for magnetic stripe is still
included which makes it two technologies backwards compatible: magnetic stripe data
was included in the original EMV specifications for backwards compatibility, and now
for contactless EMV – based on the original contact-based EMV specifications – it is
still included and even a special ‘mag-stripe mode’ is introduced in the specifications.
However, as having only correct specifications is not enough we also looked at
actual implementations of security protocols: namely bank cards, a handheld smart
card reader for online banking and TLS implementations. State machine learning for
security protocols – what we call protocol state fuzzing – is a very useful technique to
analyse implementations. As opposed to the formal analysis that can find mistakes in
protocol specifications as discussed before, this technique can detect mistakes in actual
implementations of the protocol. Previously, state machines have been extracted from
implementations of security protocols by hand [PS11], but using protocol state fuzzing
this can be automated. A general observation that can be made is that most of the
state machines learned from implementations are more complicated than one would
expect and is necessary. Especially when implementing security protocols it is crucial
to not introduce superfluous behaviour as this might eventually lead to security issues.
For TLS it was clear to see that developers might not always have a clear picture of the
state machine in mind of the state machine for the protocol they are implementing: in
3 out of 9 implementations we discovered new flaws using this method (GnuTLS, Java
Secure Socket Extension and OpenSSL). Developers will always look at the ‘correct’
path as this is vital for correct functioning of the implementation, but it is just as
important to consider what to do if unexpected things happen. One hopes that every
developer makes a conscious decision about the state machine when implementing a
protocol, though everybody still has to struggle to extract them from the specifications
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from scratch.
The success of protocol state fuzzing demonstrated in this thesis highlights the
usefulness of state machines as a specification formalism. We discovered a surprising
variety of state machines found in smart card implementations of EMV and TLS
implementations. This suggests it would be good to have these state machines in the
actual specifications. Ideally every protocol specification would come with a state
machine. And even when no state machine is provided, at least a test harness can be
provided to test an implementation.
Considering our current and previous findings, the question is who takes respon-
sibility of the security of protocols like EMV. Many parties are involved in the EMV
ecosystem such as EMVCo, payments systems, banks and manufacturers. These par-
ties seem to place a lot of trust into each other when it comes to security of the
protocols and devices that are in use. A clear example of this is the e.dentifier2: how
was it possible that the bug in the device was not picked up by any of the parties
involved before?
Based on observations we made during the analysis of the e.dentifier2 we proposed
a solution for a handheld card reader for online transactions that provides stronger
security guarantees than existing devices: the Radboud Reader. The trusted com-
puting base of this device is minimised and thus it is easier to check and less trust
has to be placed in the manufacturer of the device.
8.1 Future work
A useful next step would be to add support for protocol state fuzzing of other security
protocols, e.g. PPTP, IPSec, WEP and WPA. This can be used to analyse existing
implementations and aid developers implementing these protocols.
Also it would be good to come up with reference state machines for existing
protocols, as these are usually not yet included in protocol specifications. This could
provide important guidance for any developer implementing a security protocol.
To make protocol state fuzzing even more powerful, it might prove useful to add
additional information to the analysis. This could, for example, be the timing of
responses. This information might be used to find timing attacks against implemen-
tation, e.g. when the response time is dependent on the number of correct numbers
in a PIN code. An orthogonal direction would be to take into account code coverage,
branch coverage or actual source code in a grey-box or white-box setting respectively.
This would take advantage of additional access developers or users might have to the
implementations that are tested. This method could be extended by using the learned
model as guidance in traditional fuzzing.
Analysis of the EMV ecosystem could be extended by considering payment ter-
minals and other systems used in the back-end. Analysis of these systems can again
be done using formal analysis of the specifications and protocol state fuzzing on ac-
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tual implementations. Previous research has shown that these devices are not without
flaws [DMA08,Bre14], so there might still be room for improvement for these systems.
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